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ABSTRACT
Director: Glynn D. Coates, Ph.D.
The purposes of this research were two-fold: (1) to assess
the reliability and utility of the Aircrew Coordination 
Observation and Evaluation scales in describing crew 
coordination behaviors exhibited during flight and (2) to 
investigate the effects of automation on crew coordination, 
workload, and performance. Two levels of automation (i.e., 
presence or absence of an autopilot) and two levels of task 
difficulty (i.e., presence or absence of wind and 
turbulence) were combined to yield a 2 x 2 design. Twenty- 
four two-person crews performed in both levels of automation 
and one of two levels of task difficulty. The results of 
the reliability assessment demonstrated that the training 
procedures and behavioral summary scale anchors that were 
developed produced adequate levels of interrater reliability 
in this investigation. The results of the crew coordination 
analyses revealed differences in the frequency and quality 
of crew coordination behaviors between levels of automation. 
Ratings of crew coordination were also shown to be related 
to performance. The results also indicated that although 
crews in the automated condition reported less workload, 
only one of the three measures of flight performance was 
improved. In addition, under high task difficulty, problem 
solving performance was worse in the automated condition
i
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than in the manual condition. Interpretation and 
suggestions for future research are discussed.
ii
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Most successful operations in military and civilian 
organizations stem from the integrated performance of 
individuals making decisions within a team framework. In 
order to achieve team objectives, the teams are required to 
coordinate their actions by sharing resources or 
information. Regardless of the organizational setting, the 
basic assessment of teams has proven most difficult. A 
great number of variables must be sifted through in order to 
pinpoint sources of a team's inadequacies and strengths, as 
well as to allow realistic predictions of future levels of 
achievement. In addition to this complexity, these teams 
frequently consist of individuals in remote locations 
performing different tasks that must be combined in a 
coordinated effort to accomplish their overall objectives 
(e.g., air traffic controllers and aircraft pilots).
Over the past 40 years, considerable energy and 
resources have been expended to determine the factors that 
strengthen team performance, particularly within the 
aviation context. Researchers in military aviation have 
been concerned with the enhancement of the coordinated 
performance of teams as early as the 1950s (Hood, 1960; 
Sherwood, 1953). In these investigations, training content 
and techniques were developed and evaluated to determine 
more effective methods of increasing the mission 
effectiveness of aircrews. Similar research was continued
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2during the 1960s in a series of investigations conducted to 
identify key elements (e.g., task fidelity, training type, 
system criteria changes, member replacement) that influence 
the performance of teams (e.g., Briggs & Johnston, 1966a, 
b; Briggs & Naylor, 1965; Johnston, 1966; Naylor & Briggs, 
1965). All of these efforts focused on tasks that involved 
the coordinated performance of individuals within teams.
The search for ways to enhance team performance has 
continued more recently in the commercial air transport 
industry. Conclusions derived from research projects 
(Ruffell Smith, 1979) and from commercial aviation accident 
and incident data bases (Billings & Reynard, 1981; Lauber, 
1980) have identified Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) as 
an important ingredient in safe and efficient aircraft 
operations. CRM is defined as the utilization of 
information, equipment, and people as resources to achieve 
safe and efficient flight operations (Lauber, 1980). Over 
the past decade, numerous programs have been instituted to 
train aircrews to manage aircraft resources more 
effectively.
The military also has begun to take another look at crew 
coordination (i.e., another term for CRM used by the 
military) as a means of enhancing safety and mission 
effectiveness of flight. A critical incident analysis of 
Army aviation accidents indicated that poor crew 
coordination contributes to poor flight safety (Thornton &
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3Zeller, 1990). In addition, experimental evidence obtained 
from B-52 crews identified improved crew coordination as an 
enhancer of performance on mission tasks (Povenmire,
Rockway, Bunecke, & Patton, 1989). Although crew 
coordination is not a new concept, renewed interest in crew 
coordination as a moderator of aircrew performance has 
changed the focus of team training research in the past few 
years. Initial studies (e.g., Krumm & Farina, 1960; 1962) 
examined the effects of training aircrews within an 
individual context in contrast to being trained in an 
integrated context. Current efforts are directed at 
training crew skills above and beyond the individual skills 
required for the mission (Bowers & Morgan, in preparation).
Another variable that has recently been considered a 
moderator of team performance is the automation of 
previously manually operated aircraft systems. Automation 
is frequently cited as an additional resource that requires 
special management by the aircrew in order to maintain the 
cockpit environment safely and effectively. Because 
automation affects the design and function of aircraft 
systems, changes in the training of aircrews who operate 
these systems are required. The development of training 
that includes a strategy for managing automation as a 
resource appears to be a worthy aspiration for those 
responsible for aviation safety; however, researchers must 
first provide a more thorough documentation of the automated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4related changes in crew behaviors before instituting new 
programs.
Automation has been conceptualized and defined by many 
scientists (e.g., Fitts, 1951; Hess, 1987; Wickens, 1984). 
Morgan, Herschler, Wiener, & Salas (in press) have expanded 
the concept of automation to include its effects on team 
performance. They define human-centered automation "to 
include (a) programmed electronic or mechanized support 
systems which are under the control of system operators, and 
(b) system-state information displays which permit effective 
system management, facilitate interaction and transfer of 
control among crew members and allow timely interventions 
when degradation occurs." Unfortunately, until the past 
few years, the automation of support systems and displays 
has been technology-centered, rather than human-centered 
(Woods, 1988). The technology driven focus on automation 
(i.e., how to automate, not if to automate) has produced a 
number of effects, not always positive, on the management of 
aircraft flight systems.
The determination of whether automation actually 
produces better performance than manual modes appears 
inappropriate (Wickens, 1984). Because arguments for and 
against the benefits of automation can be advanced by using 
different research findings, Wickens, Marsh, Raby, Straus, 
Cooper, Hulin, & Switzer (1989) recommend examining other 
variables that may interact with automation features.
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5Workload and crew coordination are two such likely 
moderators of performance.
Initially, the relationship between automation and 
workload was assumed to be inverse; as automation increased, 
the workload of the crew would decrease. The acceptance of 
this belief is shown by the 1982 Presidential task force 
that endorsed the two-person cockpit in commercial aircraft. 
The task force presumed that automation could sufficiently 
replace the third crew member without increasing the 
workload of the other two crew members (Wiener, 1985). In 
support of the move to the smaller aircrew, it must be noted 
that only one major accident has occurred in the advanced 
cockpit airframe since the implementation of the automated 
crew member. Sabotage, rather than human error in the 
cockpit, has been hypothesized to be the cause of that 
accident (Proctor & Mecham, 1991). However, an inverse 
relationship between automation and workload does not hold 
true in all situations (Wickens, 1984).
Speculation about the exact relationship between 
automation and crew coordination behaviors also has arisen 
in relation to the safety and effectiveness of the flight. 
The introduction of automation in flight systems has been 
hypothesized to affect the manner in which the crew members 
coordinate their activities (Norman & Orlady, 1988a). In 
addition, other researchers have expressed concern that the 
automation of flight systems may produce unanticipated
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6negative consequences in the overall performance 
requirements for flight crews (Buley, 1985; Morgan et al., 
in press; Wiener & Curry, 1980). To provide evidence for 
these concerns, an experimental examination of the potential 
moderating effects of automation on the workload, the 
coordination behaviors, and the performance of the crew is 
needed.
Other circumstances may also interact with automation to 
produce differential effects on workload and coordination 
behaviors displayed by the crew. These include situations 
which involve changes in the environment (e.g., decreased 
visibility due to weather) or within the aircraft (e.g., 
engine failure). The crew must deal effectively with similar 
circumstances to complete the flight successfully (e.g., 
land safely and on time). Situations like these have been 
used previously in experimental paradigms designed to 
examine decision-making and planning behaviors in 
experienced aircrews (Johannsen & Rouse, 1983; Oranasu,
1989). Increases in the difficulty of the flight are made 
by requiring additional or more complex responses from the 
crews. Such responses are also likely to change the 
workload, crew coordination requirements, and subsequent 
performance of the crew.
The current research examines the role of automation in 
creating a new task structure with different requirements 
for successful performance. Specifically, the research
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7explores the potential effects of automating the primary 
flight controls in a low fidelity flight simulator. The 
ways in which automation may affect workload, coordination 
behaviors, and crew performance are investigated. Each of 
these topics is discussed in the following sections.
The Individual in Automated Systems
The advent of the industrial revolution brought basic 
changes to the design of jobs as a function of mechanization 
and automation (Rosenbrock, 1983). Task fragmentation 
frequently occurred to the extent that human skills were no 
longer central to the job; the principal role was given to 
the machine. The traditional approach to the allocation of 
functions was to assign the human the remainder of the tasks 
that could not be automated (Macek, 1982). Combining the 
leftover tasks into a single job often produced one 
consisting of unrelated tasks. Increased human mistakes and 
decreased job satisfaction followed. The automation of jobs 
using this allocation approach defined the human role by 
default. The resultant breakdown in job cohesiveness 
frequently created undesirable consequences for both the 
individual and the organization.
As automation capabilities spread throughout various 
industries, Bright (1958) posited changes in the work 
requirements as a function of automation. He noted a 
general trend indicating that increasing levels of 
automation tended to reduce the job content and the human
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8contribution required (e.g., physical effort, training, 
mental effort); however, he suggested that aviation was a 
possible exception to his thesis. Increased responsibility 
for more systems, higher caliber duties, and new skills were 
three factors expected to counteract the decreases in human 
requirements found in automated industries.
Researchers during the 1960s verified that technological 
changes frequently lead to changes in the job activities of 
the individuals. In actual investigations conducted in 
factories, automation was found to increase the mental 
demands of the job (Whyte, 1961), feelings of responsibility 
(Mann & Hoffman, 1960) and pressure (Mann & Hoffman, 1960; 
Whyte, 1961), and to decrease control (Blauner, 1964). 
Increased automation was shown to affect workers in a number 
of ways.
More recent analyses of automated systems (offices, 
robotics, computer-assisted manufacturing, and process 
control environments) also indicate evolving roles for the 
individuals involved with these systems. Czaja (1987) 
reported that automation in the office affects the structure 
and content of jobs leading to the routinization, 
simplification, and fragmentation of jobs. In addition, 
office automation can decrease control over workload and 
make current skills obsolete. Bullinger, Korndorfer, & 
Salvendy (1987) summarized the effects of robots on the work 
force as follows: (1) more psychological stress and less
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9physical strain, (2) decreased skills to operate equipment 
and more skills to maintain and program equipment, (3) 
decreased direct control of activities and more indirect 
activities such as monitoring, maintenance, repair, (4) 
different safety issues, (5) and changes in the work 
situations available to personnel (e.g., situation 
determined by the tools rather than by the subject of the 
work). Similarly, when the effect of computerized 
manufacturing automation on the workplace was examined in 
four organizations (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984), 
the automation was found to increase the need for skills 
such as programming, monitoring, and maintenance, but 
required less decision making and motor skills. Boredom in 
some jobs, safety from physical hazards, and stress also 
increased.
As a final example, process control environments such as 
nuclear power plants have also seen an evolution in the role 
of individuals. The human role has become one of 
information processor and decision maker (Woods, O'Brien, 
and Hanes, 1987). When performing as a supervisor, "the 
individual monitors and manages a partially self-controlling 
process, handles the unexpected, and provides backup control 
when automatic systems fail or when disturbances are beyond 
automatic response capabilities" p.1738. The human's 
primary function becomes cognitive (e.g., setting goals, 
solving problems); sensing is only a secondary function.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Woods (1988) recently summarized the effects of 
automation on the human's role based on field studies and 
controlled studies from non-aviation industries 
(computerized numerical control in manufacturing, banking 
information systems and processes, steel processes, and 
nuclear industries). The studies were conducted to identify 
the effects of technology on productivity and quality of 
human performance. When technology centered automation was 
applied, Woods found that the human role in system 
performance was altered in unexpected ways. The patterns of 
human skills were changed and the ability to adapt to 
unanticipated variability became the critical human 
function. As a result, new error forms and types of system 
breakdowns typically occurred.
The role of the pilot in increasingly automated cockpit 
environments has also been altered in unexpected ways, 
generating a host of accompanying problems. Issues such as 
complacency and inattentiveness (Miles, Miller, &
Variakojis, 1982), flexibility and vigilance (Wiener,
1987a), types and severity of errors (Bainbridge, 1987), 
diffusion of responsibility between crew members and 
aircraft systems (Farrell, 1987), training techniques 
(Bohem-Davis, Curry, Wiener, & Harrison, 1983), and 
maintenance of expertise and technical skills (Gannett,
1982) have been associated with automation in advanced 
technology aircraft. In some cases the problems may be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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related to poorly designed systems or improper training for 
the aircrews. In other cases, the problems are suggested to 
be related to fundamental changes in the inherent role of 
the pilot.
Analogous to process control operators, the role of the 
pilot has shifted from that of a control manipulator to that 
of a systems manager (Chambers & Nagel, 1985; Graeber,
1989). Although the pilot retains responsibility for the 
operation and safety of the aircraft, repetitive and mundane 
tasks are performed by automated systems. The role of 
automation may be viewed as to provide assistance to the 
aircrew in the performance of their tasks and in the 
management of aircraft systems (Norman & Orlady, 1988b). 
Although automation plays a large role in controlling and 
stabilizing the aircraft, automation should especially 
support the aircrew in guidance, control, navigation and 
systems monitoring. In contrast, the basic pilot functions 
are to "aviate, navigate, communicate, and operate" (Norman 
& Orlady, 1988b, p. 139). The maintenance of situation 
dominance, an awareness of and control over the status of 
the aircraft, is viewed as the central activity of the 
pilot.
Norman & Orlady (1988c) argue that the fundamental role 
of the pilot has not changed. In accordance with Federal 
Aviation Regulation 91.3, the pilot in command of the 
aircraft is still directly responsible for and has final
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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authority over the operation of the aircraft. Regardless of 
the machinery used, the pilot's primary role of monitoring 
systems and flight path management is not altered, even 
though some machinery can simplify or abolish the demand for 
certain tasks (Norman & Orlady, 1988c). Yet, it may also be 
argued that the manner by which monitoring and managing must 
transpire has been altered with the introduction of more 
sophisticated systems.
The prevailing doctrine over the past 3 0 years 
concerning the relationship of machines and humans has been 
that automated devices should control systems and humans 
should supervise and monitor the devices' actions, 
intervening when necessary (Wiener, 1985; 1987a). Wiener 
notes ironically that the doctrine thus fostered places 
humans in a predicament for which they are poorly skilled. 
Monitoring is not a task in which humans are known to excel. 
Speyer (1989) reports that vigilance research has shown 
humans to be ineffective monitors, less likely to detect 
system faults or incorrect setups, and more likely to commit 
large blunders.
Yet, many traditional vigilance studies involve tasks 
and subjects bearing little similarity to operational 
aviation (Wiener, 1987a). Robert, Hockey, & Tattersall 
(1989) assert that the vigilance required to monitor 
automated systems involves an active involvement in 
searching, problem-solving, predicting, and planning in
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contrast to a passive involvement in receiving or detecting 
signals typically demanded in earlier watchkeeping tasks.
The maintenance of vigilance in automated systems requires 
participation from the individuals beyond that of 
maintaining a state of perceptual readiness.
Indeed, it appears that the demands made on pilots in 
automated systems are reflected in more than one area of the 
flight task. Additionally, different levels of effort for 
various functions are required to preserve task performance. 
During a workshop on flight deck automation and crew 
coordination, Norman & Orlady (1988a) concluded that flight 
deck automation alters the actual structure of the flight 
task in five areas: systems operations, primary flight
control, navigation systems, checklists, and flight deck 
communication. As a result of automation, changes in task 
structure affect the role of the pilots. These authors 
indicate that in automated systems, pilots monitor systems 
less actively, perform less mental arithmetic, and use more 
cognitive rather than motor skills. The pilot flying 
assumes more of managerial role; the pilot not flying 
participates more in flight control, but less in the 
monitoring of systems. Changes in the flight task structure 
also have implications for the aircrew as a team.
Teams in Automated Systems
Just as changes in task structure affect the role of 
individuals by altering the behaviors required in the task,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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evidence suggests that it also compels changes in the 
behaviors of teams. Small group research conducted by 
Sorenson (1971) found significant relationships between task 
type (production or problem solving) and task behavior 
(i.e., interaction processes such as structuring, 
generating, elaborating, evaluating, and requesting 
behaviors). Further analyses suggested that different types 
of tasks placed different demands on groups by 
systematically altering the behaviors required to accomplish 
the task.
The findings of research specifically designed to 
examine the effects of technological change also indicate a 
change in the working relationships among individuals. For 
example, increased automation decreased the opportunities 
the workers had to interact with their coworkers (Whyte, 
1961; Goodman & Argote, 1984). In another situation, 
Williams and Williams (1964) found that the introduction of 
numerical control machines required more coordinating 
activities between production and support personnel. 
Automation in offices affected communication and interaction 
patterns between workers and created perceptions of support 
loss and distance from coworkers (Czaja, 1987). Finally, in 
a computerized manufacturing automation environment, Office 
of Technology (1984) reported that interactions among 
workers involved greater interdependence, collaboration, and 
need for cooperation among workers. Autonomy typically
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decreased. As suggested by Zuboff (1981), changes in areas 
such as information technology affect the relationships 
between the people, the tasks, and the organization.
Small group and technological change research findings 
are supportive of the observations made by Norman & Orlady 
(1988a) regarding changes in interpersonal relationships and 
procedures in advanced technology aircraft. In addition to 
changes in individual roles, changes have been observed in 
aircrew interrelationships related to task structure and 
cultural modifications. More specifically, they reported 
task structure changes that increased cross-check workload, 
flight path control coordination, and more evenly 
distributed workload between crew members. Cultural changes 
also occurred. For example, although the captain and first 
officer roles did not change, the individual roles of the 
pilot flying (PF) and pilot not flying (PNF) did. 
Specifically, the cultural changes included a more even 
distribution of responsibility between PF and PNF with the 
PNF assuming more responsibility and a reversed flow of 
information between the PF and PNF.
These observations suggest that the processes by which 
crew members interact in an automated setting differ from 
traditional settings and merit further examination.
Although speculation exists regarding the nature of aircrew 
interactions in advanced technology aircraft, little 
empirical evidence has been gathered. Wiener, Chidester,
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Kanki, Palmer, Curry and Gregorich (1991) are presently 
conducting an investigation in operational aircraft to 
examine differences in interaction requirements between 
traditional and technologically advanced aircraft.
Hopefully, this and similar inquiries will shed some light 
on the nature of any differences present.
In Sorenson's terminology, it appears that different 
demands are placed on aircrews as a function of the new 
behaviors required to perform the automated task. The role 
of teams in automated systems may center around changes in 
the interaction behaviors and requirements that evolve from 
modifications in the tasks being performed. A relevant 
concept, coordination demand, is described as "the extent to 
which a given flight task paces a requirement (demand) for 
the crew to interact, cooperate, or coordinate their 
activities in order to accomplish the task" (Bowers, Morgan, 
& Salas, 1991). If crucial requirements for the successful 
performance of teams are determined by the characteristics 
and demands of the task which influence team interactions, 
as Roby & Lanzetta (1958) suggested, accompanying changes in 
crew training may be indicated after changes in task 
structure and any resultant interaction behaviors are 
identified.
Workload in Advanced Technology Aircraft
Pilot workload has been defined as "the cost incurred by 
the human operators of complex airborne systems in
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accomplishing the operational requirements imposed on them" 
(Hart, 1987, p.l). This cost reflects a combination of 
demands such as the mission requirements, the amount and 
clarity of information and equipment provided, the flight 
environment, and the pilots' skills, experience, adopted 
strategies, exertion of effort, and emotional responses to 
the situation. An increasingly complex and variable 
environment is presented to the aircrews with the 
development of advanced technology aircraft, such as the 
environment of the "glass cockpit".
The cost to an individual pilot for the operation of 
flight systems is frequently evaluated as a dependent 
variable in terms of mental workload. Although physical 
workload is much easier to define and measure in terms of 
energy expenditure, the actual physical workload of a pilot 
is not usually a concern in the advanced technology 
aircraft. Unfortunately, mental workload has no simple, 
single definition or measure. Individual, rather than team 
workload, is typically measured. The three most common 
measures are defined according the manner in which workload 
is measured: subjective rating scales, secondary tasks, and
physiological measures.
Automation, probably more than any other factor, has 
altered workload drastically, and may both decrease and 
increase the workload of the crew. For example, although 
workload is reduced when automated devices perform tasks
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previously accomplished by the crew, the responsibility for 
the operation of the device remains with the crew, thus 
increasing their monitoring requirements. In a related 
field study conducted by Wiener (1989), pilots reported 
sometimes turning off automatic features (e.g., of a flight 
guidance system) and reverting to manual mode because of 
their difficulty in managing the system during periods of 
particularly high workload. Wiener indicates that many 
automatic features originally designed to decrease workload 
are not reaching their potential because of software and 
hardware problems.
Phase of flight and the presence or absence of system 
failures or of other unplanned events (e.g., deteriorated 
environmental conditions) also introduce different workload 
levels to crews by changing the difficulty of their tasks. 
The interaction of automation with these factors may 
influence workload in unintended ways. For example, flight 
performance and subjective workload were found to be 
affected differentially by the presence of automation, 
emergency conditions, and crew composition (Wickens et al., 
1989). Fifty aircrews flew a twin-seat GAT II flight 
simulator either with or without autopilot controls both in 
normal flight conditions and in conditions of system 
failure. Crews were divided into homogenous (i.e., similar 
experience) and heterogeneous (i.e., dissimilar experience)
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groups. Use of the autopilot resulted in better performance 
and lower subjective workload.
However, a closer inspection of the workload measure 
produced unexpected results. When workload was analyzed 
during system failures, automation produced differential 
workload according to the composition of the crew. 
Heterogeneous groups showed little increase in workload 
between manual and automated conditions during system 
failures; yet homogeneous groups showed a much greater 
increase in workload when automation was present. Thus, the 
perception of workload level may not be affected 
consistently by level of automation and crew composition. 
Crew Coordination in Advanced Technology Aircraft
As with the concept of workload, no single, universally 
accepted operational definition of crew coordination is 
found in the literature. When viewed as an interactive 
behavior, it becomes difficult to describe, define, and 
measure (Hall & Rizzo, 1975). Turney, Cohen, & Greenberg 
(1981) indicated that the operational definition of 
coordination is determined by the context of the task 
itself. For example, Army aviation emphasizes the verbal 
and behavioral responses in rotary wing flight in their 
definition. Crew coordination is defined as the interaction 
between crew members (communication) and action (sequence & 
timing) necessary for flight tasks to be performed 
efficiently, effectively, and safely (Leedom, 1990). One
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Navy definition emphasizes skills and resources, defining it 
as an organized interaction of crew skills and resources for 
the safe and effective conduct of flight (MacCuish & Morgan, 
in press). The central concept found in these definitions 
is an interaction that has safety and effectiveness as its 
goal.
Closely related concepts have been identified in 
research conducted with Naval training teams. Glickman, 
Zimmer, Montero, Guerette, Campbell, Morgan, and Salas 
(1987) identified taskwork and teamwork as the key 
components of team performance. Taskwork involves 
individual, technical and operational skills needed to 
perform the job tasks. Teamwork is the component more 
pertinent to crew coordination because it involves behaviors 
that compose interdependence, coordination, and adaptation. 
Teamwork is defined as "the set of values and behaviors 
necessary for a team to achieve its common goals and to 
adapt to the circumstances that it confronts in the work 
environment" (McIntyre, Morgan, Salas, & Glickman, 1989). 
Five essential elements are involved in teamwork: the
group's self awareness as an intradependent unit, monitoring 
team performance, providing feedback based on the 
monitoring, communicating in a closed-loop fashion, and 
backing up the actions of others. Again, implicit in the 
definition of teamwork is an interaction to achieve a common 
goal.
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Krumm (1960) identified two perspectives from which crew 
coordination is most frequently viewed: a time-bound
synchronization of actions or a response improvisation.
When individuals involved in a common activity perform 
adequately within a specified time period, a synchronization 
of action occurs. In this type of coordination, the 
responses made by crew members are structured through the 
use of formalized procedures (e.g., standard operating 
procedures). In contrast, when individuals involved in a 
common activity perform as needed in problem solving 
situations that have no immediate, prepackaged solutions, 
response improvisation occurs. In this type of coordination 
crew members recognize and share crew problems and 
objectives, maintain an awareness of others' responses and 
responsibilities, and provide responses in recognition of 
other's responses. These two perspectives are reflected in 
the distinction between established and emergent task 
situations (Boguslaw & Porter, 1962). Again, the task type 
or structure appears to drive the coordination demands made 
of the crew.
Approaches to crew coordination measurement. Two 
approaches to the measurement of crew coordination are 
typically found. The analyses of communication pattern and 
content are often used as one approach to the measurement of 
the coordination effort among crew members (e.g., Krumm & 
Farina, 1962; Povenmire, Rockway, Bunecke, & Patton, 1989;
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Thornton, Kaempf, Zeller, & McAnulty, 1991). The analyses 
of verbal communication is assumed to provide an assessment 
of coordination interactions.
A second approach is to use trained evaluators to rate 
performance on several dimensions of crew coordination. 
Helmreich and Wilhelm (1989) developed a worksheet, Line 
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), for check airmen to 
evaluate CRM in both simulators and aircraft. This 
evaluation tool is frequently used to assess crew 
performance in training situations.
Another promising measure of crew coordination is based 
on a series of investigations that identified and analyzed 
the critical behaviors and subsequent behavioral dimensions 
found to be crucial in the development of effective crew 
coordination (Glickman et al., 1987; Morgan, Glickman, 
Woodward, Blaiwes, & Salas, 1986; Oser, McCallum, Morgan, & 
Salas, 1989). Using this earlier research as a foundation, 
a systematic, extensive review was conducted of crew 
coordination programs, both commercial and military, the 
tream research literature, and aviation data sources 
(Prince, Salas, & Franz, 1990). Behaviorally defined 
management skills that were extracted from a review of the 
management literature and skill behaviors identified for 
team training were compared to skills previously identified 
as important for crew coordination. Franz, McCallum,
Lewis, Prince, and Salas (1990) identified 37 aircrew
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coordination behaviors that they categorized into the 
following seven behavioral skill dimensions: mission
analysis, decision making, assertiveness, flexibility, 
leadership, communications, and situational awareness.
An examination of the criticality and frequencies of the 
behaviors that compose the seven dimensions established the 
utility of the behaviors (Franz, Prince, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Salas, 1990). In-depth interviews with 20 pilots from the 
Naval helicopter community yielded 18 additional behavioral 
examples of crew coordination. Twenty-one job experts 
verified the importance, difficulty and frequency of 
occurrence of behaviors. Revisions were made to reduce item 
ambiguity, and the behaviors were administered to 134 
additional job experts. Finally, the behaviors were 
classified independently by instructor pilots and aircrew 
coordination researchers under the seven dimensions 
previously indicated. As part of this process and 
revisions, the number of behaviors was further reduced to 
42. These final refinements permitted the development of 
the Aircrew Coordination Observation and Evaluation (ACOE) 
scale for use in the evaluation of crew coordination skills.
Prince, Chidester, Cannon-Bowers, and Bowers (1991) have 
suggested that in spite of differences in equipment and 
operations, enough similarity in coordination requirements 
exists so that the skill dimensions included in the ACOE are 
relevant to the behaviors of various types of aircrews.
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Although developed independently, these coordination skills 
are similar to those recommended by the FAA for inclusion in 
crew training, and have been shown to be related to skills 
and behavior definitions ordinarily used in managerial 
assessment (Maher, 1983).
Unfortunately, the potential of the ACOE to increase an 
understanding of crew coodination has not been fully 
realized. A review of published research indicates limited 
use of the scales in examining crew coordination issues 
(e.g., Franz, McCallum et al., 1990; Franz, Prince, Baker, 
Zalensny, & Salas, in preparation; Lassiter, Vaughn, Smaltz, 
Morgan, & Salas, 1990). In addition the reliability of the 
scale has not been established at this time. Therefore, an 
opportunity exists to establish the utility of this measure 
as a means of assessing crew coordination and its 
potentially moderating effects.
Changes in crew coordination. Crew coordination and 
automation are no longer considered be two model-independent 
concerns in aviation safety (Wiener, 1989). Observational 
and opinion data collected from pilots of high technology 
aircraft by Wiener indicated that cockpit automation affects 
crew coordination by influencing the way the automated 
flight is managed. Five main factors were reported to 
affect CRM in these cockpits: the physical difficulty of
seeing what the other crew member is doing, cross-monitoring 
difficulties, a breakdown in traditional roles and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
responsibilities, a redistribution of authority, and an 
increased tendency to assist others with programming during 
periods of high workload. Each factor alters the 
interaction of the crews, and potentially, their flight task 
performance.
Clothier (1991) has provided evidence that crews do 
interact differently dependent upon the technology level of 
the aircraft. The data for her analysis were obtained from 
a major domestic airline in both LOFT simulator missions and 
on the flight line. In LOFT simulations crews in advanced 
cockpits performed better than those in standard cockpits.
In evaluations made on the line, CRM performance was better 
in standard aircraft. One year later, after all pilots had 
completed CRM training, CRM performance remained better for 
crews in advanced technology aircraft than those crews 
operating in standard aircraft; however, no differences were 
found between crews on the line. The author suggested that 
the advantage of advanced technology aircraft in the LOFT 
scenarios was related to the extra time the technology 
afforded the crews to utilize their knowledge in the 
abnormal situations.
Further support for notion that crew coordination may 
be altered in relation to the level of automation employed 
is shown by an experimental examination of the relationship 
of automation, crew composition, and communication. Straus 
and Cooper (1989) conducted a communication analyses on 24
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of the 50 crews who participated in Wickens et al., (1989). 
The results indicated that more information exchange took 
place in the automated condition. Performance was better 
for crews who made a higher ratio of task relevant to task 
irrelevant statements. Several types of communication and 
performance measures were significantly correlated. The 
interactions between automation and crew composition were 
not significant. The preliminary results of this study 
provided some evidence of a relationship between automation, 
communication (i.e. crew coordination), and performance in a 
flight task.
Regardless of the level of automation in the cockpit, 
the need to maintain vigilance in aviation related tasks 
indicates that the aircrew must remain actively involved 
with the aircraft, the environment, and each other. 
Unfortunately, a frequent criticism of advanced technology 
cockpits is that the pilot may be placed out-of-the-loop, 
thus increasing the difficulty of maintaining an up-to-date 
awareness of and control over the aircraft's status. The 
maintenance of such knowledge provides the aircrew with a 
basis from which to respond quickly and appropriately should 
any emergency or abnormal situation occur.
Norman (1991) suggests that the current level of 
intelligence for automated systems is inadequate when humans 
must take over control of the system. An absence of needed 
feedback and interaction from the automated system during
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abnormalities in flight may prevent the aircrew from 
effectively dealing with the situation. Feedback and 
diagnostic interaction would normally occur between the 
aircrew. If inappropriate forms of automation are indeed a 
root problem, extra, joint effort on the part of the aircrew 
to problem solve in the absence of automated feedback may be 
required until design issues are remedied.
In addition, behaviors such as cross-monitoring, 
assertiveness, and information exchange as taught in 
traditional aviation settings may require readjustment to 
prevent such problems as complacency and inattentiveness 
(Foushee & Helmreich, 1988), diffusion of responsibility 
between crew members and aircraft systems (Foushee, 1982) or 
to prevent new and potentially more severe blunders from 
occurring (McDaniel, 1988). An aircrew may need to develop 
something akin to a finely-tuned dynamic allocation of 
function approach when interacting with each other and the 
automated system in order to readjust the distribution of 
tasks according to skill and processing load on an ongoing 
basis during a flight. Perhaps this is the area in which 
specialized crew training may prove itself most useful.
Changes in the difficulty of a task may also introduce 
changes in the coordination behaviors exhibited in flight 
situations. Although most training programs for 
coordination skills assume that more coordination is better, 
investigations of team performance by Naylor & Briggs (1965)
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and Williges, Johnston, & Briggs (1966) demonstrated that 
increased communication under high levels of workload 
interferred with performance. However, this association 
does not always hold true, as evidenced by Jensen (1962) and 
Kinkade & Kidd (1959), and the relationship between task 
difficulty and coordinaiton remains unclear.
Other research has illustrated that the task situation 
itself may influence the effectiveness of the coordination 
behaviors. Kleinman & Serfaty (1989) conducted an 
experiment in which two-person teams performed a 
computerized resource allocation task. Teams coordinated 
their resources for maximum performance through computer- 
mediated communication. As task demands increased from low 
to moderate levels, communication was utilized more 
frequently; however, communication was reduced as the 
workload (i.e., task difficulty) increased further, even 
though subjects continued to transfer resources. Only 
communication, as a subset of coordination behaviors, is 
typically examined. Further exploration of the link between 
task difficulty and crew coordination in flight situations 
is therefore warranted.
Present Research
One purpose of the present research is assess the 
reliability and utility of the ACOE scales in describing the 
crew coordination behaviors exhibited during flight. The 
development of rater training procedures and the subsequent
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identification of satisfactory interrater reliability 
provide initial support for the usefulness of this 
instrument in the present and future research.
A second purpose of the present investigation is to 
examine the relationships among crew coordination, 
automation, and workload. A review of the automation and 
team performance literature suggests the need for an 
organized research approach to delineate these 
relationships. An additional consideration is the 
difficulty level of the task. If differences in workload 
and crew coordination behaviors can be distinguished as a 
function of changes in level of automation and task 
difficulty, guidelines for planning crew training schemes 
may be developed.
Four contexts of task structure related to automation 
and task difficulty may be devised producing a 2 x 2 
factorial experimental design utilizing two levels of 
automation (automated and manual) and two levels of task 
difficulty (high and low). Verification of the effects of 
these variables on subjective workload, crew coordination, 
and the flight performance of the crew is required before 
attempting to recommend specific crew training.
Summary of Automation Hypotheses
The use of automation in the cockpit, as in other 
automated environments, has introduced changes in the 
structure of the tasks performed by the crew members (Norman
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& Orlady, 1989a). In turn, these changes potentially alter 
the performance, subjective workload, and coordination 
behaviors of the crew members. Although conflicting reports 
exists as to the actual consequences of increased 
automation, automation is designed ideally to improve 
performance and decrease the workload of the crew. 
Additionally, as the roles of the pilots are altered, 
coordination behaviors may be expected to vary as a function 
of automation level. The use of automation may provide the 
crew with more opportunities to coordinate their behaviors 
and in some circumstances, increase the demand for 
coordination. Given the limited research literature 
regarding the introduction of automation in the cockpit, the 
following hypotheses are offered.
Hypothesis 1: The level of automation is hypothesized
to have an effect on the ability of the aircrew to perform 
their flight tasks. Crews in the automated condition 
perform their flight tasks better than crews in the manual 
condition.
Hypothesis 2: The level of automation is hypothesized
to influence the ability of the aircrew to develop an 
optimal flight route. Crews in the automated condition 
develop more optimal flight routes than crews in the manual 
condition.
Hypothesis 3; The level of automation is hypothesized 
to affect the subjective workload of the crew members. The
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crews in the automated condition perceive less workload than 
the crews in the manual condition.
Hypothesis 4; The level of automation is hypothesized to 
affect the distribution of crew coordination behaviors 
displayed by the crew. Crews in the automated condition 
display different coordination behaviors than those in the 
manual condition.
Hypothesis 5: Automation level is not hypothesized to
affect the quality of the crew coordination displayed by the 
crew. The quality of crew coordination displayed does not 
differ in relation to the level of automation available. 
Summary of Task Difficulty Hypotheses
Although changes in the difficulty of a given task may 
produce changes in performance, other consequences (e.g., 
decreases in workload or changes in coordination behaviors) 
may provide additional information about the nature of the 
task. An examination of different levels of task difficulty 
may be particularily useful if expected changes in 
performance do not immediately appear. For example, 
inclement weather, systems failures, or unplanned events 
that can increase the difficulty of flight tasks may not 
prevent an aircraft from reaching its destination. However, 
if the presence of these conditions is sustained over time, 
changes in the workload of an individual may eventually 
produce decrements in performance.
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Hypothesis 1: The level of task difficulty is
hypothesized to affect the ability of the crew to perform 
their flight tasks. Crews in the low task difficulty 
condition perform their flying tasks better than the crews 
in the high task difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 2: The level of task difficulty is
hypothesized to affect the ability of the crew to develop an 
optimal flight route. Crews in the low task difficulty 
condition develop better flight routes than the crews in the 
high task difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 3: The level of task difficulty is
hypothesized to affect the subjective workload of the crew 
members. Crews in the low task difficulty condition 
perceive less workload than crews in the high task 
difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 4: The level of task difficulty is
hypothesized to affect the distribution of crew coordination 
behaviors displayed by the crew. Crews in the low task 
difficulty condition display different coordination 
behaviors than those in the high task difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 5: The level of task difficulty is not
hypothesized to affect the quality of the crew coordination 
displayed by the crew. The quality of crew coordination 
displayed does not differ in relation to the level of task 
difficulty.
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II. METHOD
In the present investigation, the crew coordination 
performance, task performance, and workload of 48 crews were 
assessed in a low fidelity aircraft simulation. The 
following sections describe the participants, apparatus, and 
procedures used. In addition, the development of the flight 
scenarios, task performance and crew coordination measures 
that were employed is also described in detail.
Participants
The participants were 96 students attending Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University (86 male and 10 female). The median 
age of the participants was 20. The median flight hours 
attained was 140. All participants held a current private 
pilot's license; 30 participants held more advanced ratings. 
Participants received $10.00 for their involvement. Ninety- 
six students formed 48 crews of two individuals each.
Design
Two levels of automation and two levels of task 
difficulty were combined to yield a 2 x 2 factorial design. 
The level of automation was manipulated by the presence or 
absence of an autopilot (i.e., automation or manual mode). 
That is, when the autopilot is engaged in the navigation 
lock mode, the airplane automatically maintains a 
preselected altitude and flies directly toward a very high 
frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) radial. Task 
difficulty was manipulated by the presence or absence of
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turbulence and wind in the simulator scenario (i.e., high or 
low task difficulty).
The flight task consisted of four variations: (1) 
manual-low difficulty, (2) manual-high difficulty, (3) 
automation-low difficulty, and (4) automation-high 
difficulty. Each of the flight task variations were 
examined by having 24 crews perform in both levels of 
automation and one level of task difficulty. The 
participants were randomly assigned to one level of task 
difficulty.
Apparatus
The low-fidelity flight simulation, Flight Simulator 4.0 
(Microsoft), was employed for this investigation. FIight 
Simulator was modified by the manufacturer to provide flight 
performance measures. The software presents external visual 
scenes above the instrument panel on the monitor (see Figure 
1). The aircraft configuration used was that of a Cessna 
182-RG. Only one navigation radio was provided.
The hardware configuration comprised: (1) a Personal 
Computer with two monitors, (2) three headsets with 
microphones, (3) an audio system capable of combining 
several channels of verbal communication, (4) a mouse, (5) a 
joystick, and (6) video recording equipment. A partition 
separated the experimenter's station from the crew's 
station. A video camera placed above the experimenter's
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station was used to record the crews during the flight 
scenario. The camera was positioned to provide a distinct 
view of the crews' faces and was connected to an audio/video 
recorder. Participants communicated with each other and the 
experimenter via headsets with microphones. All utterances 
transmitted on the intercommunication system were recorded. 
Flight Simulator Task Separation
Flight Simulator is designed to be performed by one 
individual using a keyboard, mouse, and joystick to fly the 
simulator. However, participants in this research 
performed the flight scenarios as two-person crews, with one 
individual (the pilot) controlling the joystick and the 
other (the copilot) controlling the mouse. Control of the 
keyboard could be assigned at the discretion of the pilot. 
This division of tasks required the coordination of the 
activities of both participants for successful mission 
completion.
Simulated Flight Scenario Overview
Several criteria were used to develop the two flight 
scenarios for this research project. First, the scenario 
was designed to present events that were likely to be 
affected by crew coordination (e.g., events that would 
require interaction between the crew members). Second, the 
scenario was designed to evaluate the crews' performance on 
tasks for which they might reasonably be asked to perform 
given an emergency situation. Third, the scenario was
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designed to allow replication in different inodes of 
automation.
The two scenarios that were developed involved flying 
relief supplies to one of two types of disaster: a tornado
or gasoline pipeline rupture. The scenarios were similar 
except for type of disaster, airfield names, and supplies 
available. The duration of each scenario was approximately 
45-minutes.
The scenarios required that the crew work together to 
obtain and deliver supplies to one of three disaster sites 
(e.g., the tornado touched down in three locations). Both 
flying and navigation skills were required to obtain 
supplies from different airfields. The crew members could 
share the responsibility of determining which supplies to 
deliver and developing a flight plan to do so. The 
efficiency with which crew members performed their roles 
influenced the accomplishment of the crew's overall 
objectives.
The experimenter played the role of three control 
centers (i.e., Tower, Center, and Operations) during the 
scenario. Tower provided clearance for takeoff and handed 
off the crew to Center. Center informed the crew of their 
expected time of arrival (ETA) to each airfield check point. 
Operations provided the crew with specific information and 
instructions regarding the status of the disaster and their 
overall mission.
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The crew had three primary flight tasks to perform 
throughout the experimental scenarios. First, they were to 
maintain an altitude throughout the scenario as specified in 
the premission briefing. Second, they were to maintain the 
course to each airfield check point as accurately as 
possible. Third, the crew were to reach each check point at 
the appropriate time as instructed by Center. A check point 
was reached when the aircraft flew through a large box 
placed in the air directly over the check point's VOR. The 
box was 1,000 feet wide and high; the center of the box was 
located at 4000 ft. Landing the aircraft was not required.
Mission briefing materials. Both a written and a 
prerecorded, verbal mission briefing containing the flight 
requirements and details of the mission were presented to 
each crew before the scenario began. Appendix A contains 
the mission briefing for the tornado scenario in the high 
workload condition. The briefing materials also included a 
navigation map and a mission log (see Appendices B and C for 
the tornado scenario). The map was a quasi-low altitude 
navigation chart that presented airways and VORs. The 
mission log provided the crew with information which, for 
the most part, was also verbally presented to them by 
Operations. The contents of the log were not reviewed until 
the crew received instruction from Operations.
Experimental scenario composition. Each scenario was 
divided into five flight segments that were conducted
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contiguously. In the cockpit prior to takeoff, Operations 
instructed the crew to record flight data (e.g., 
destinations, expected time of arrival (ETA), actual time of 
arrival (ATA) on the form provided throughout the mission.
In addition, the crew was to rank individually the supplies 
available for delivery in order of usefulness in providing 
relief to the disaster scene. They were given an 
approximate departure time and a course for the first two 
segments of flight.
The first flight segment was designed to give the crew 
time to consider together the supplies that would be useful 
in providing disaster relief and to become familiar with the 
locations of the supplies. Thus, Operations instructed the 
crew to reach a consensus as to the ranking of the 
usefulness of the supplies and provided the locations of the 
supplies.
During the second flight segment, the crew received 
further instructions about the specifics of their mission. 
Operations informed the crew that they had time to pick up 
four supplies and deliver them to one disaster site. They 
were to fly the designated airways only; if they flew over a 
supply check point, a supply must be obtained. The crew was 
instructed to identify their first supply check point and 
inform Operations of their decision two miles prior to their 
present check point (i.e., Midway). After the crew reported 
their first supply check point, they were instructed to fly
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to a specific supply check point (i.e., Lewis) to pick up a 
supply after reaching Midway. The crew received this 
instruction regardless of the first supply check point the 
crew had chosen.
During the third flight segment, the crew was informed 
which supplies were specifically needed at each disaster 
site and the usefulness of the supplies in terms of the 
supply's point value for that site. Based on this 
information, the crews were instructed to develop a flight 
plan to pick up three additional supplies and deliver them 
to a disaster site. Additionally, they were to maximize the 
number of points acquired, thus ensuring that the most 
useful supplies would be delivered.
During the remaining two flight segments, four and five, 
the crew was required to fly to the next two supply check 
points that they had chosen and obtain the second and third 
supply. After they reached the third supply check point in 
segment five, the scenario ended. The crew was informed 
that environmental conditions would preclude them from 
continuing further and that the current supply point was 
their final destination. Appendix D presents an outline of 
the script used by the experimenter for the tornado disaster 
in the high difficulty condition.
Practice scenario composition. Preliminary data 
indicated that one hour of practice in the flight simulator 
was sufficient for the aircrews to become familiar with the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
flight simulator, interactions with the control centers, and 
the flight performance requirements. The crew first 
received a 15-minute introduction to the simulator 
instrument panel and the controls required to fly the 
simulator. A list of crew responsibilities and checklist 
procedures were provided to the crew (see Appendices E and 
F). The crew then flew a practice scenario, similar to the 
experimental scenario, except for the requirement to obtain 
and deliver supplies. That is, during the practice 
scenario, the crew flew from check point to check point, 
maintaining an altitude of 4000 feet above ground level, and 
calculating airspeeds needed to reach each destination on 
schedule; however, the flight route was predetermined for 
them and the need to make decisions about the course of 
flight was not introduced. The crew was instructed to work 
as a team by assisting each other when possible.
Procedures
All flight data were collected over a period of 7 weeks. 
Typically, two crews were observed each day, one crew during 
a morning session and one during an afternoon session. 
Participants were assigned a crew mate randomly; however, 
the participants who indicated that they wished to perform 
as a crew were so assigned.
Experimental sessions. After completing an informed 
consent form, each participant completed a demographic 
information sheet (see Appendix G). Participants were then
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randomly assigned either the role of the pilot or the 
copilot. Following the completion of the practice scenario, 
participants flew the first experimental flight scenario. 
After completion of the first scenario, participants 
completed a subjective assessment of workload, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index (NASA 
TLX) developed by Hart and Staveland (1988). After a ten 
minute rest break, the participants flew the second 
experimental flight scenario and again completed the 
workload assessment. Finally, the participants responded to 
a post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix H) and were 
debriefed by the experimenter.
Flight Performance
Summary values for each of the flight performance 
measures were computed for each crew.
Altitude deviation. The crews were instructed to 
maintain an altitude of 4000 feet throughout the scenario. 
The root mean square error (RMSE) for altitude deviation 
from designated altitude was calculated in feet for 
intervals of 15 seconds for each crew.
Course deviation. The crews were required to remain on 
the designated airways as closely as possible throughout 
each scenario. The RMSE for the deviation from designated 
course was calculated in tenths of a mile for each 15 second 
interval.
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Time deviation. The crews were instructed to reach each 
airfield check point at a specific time as determined by 
Center. Each ETA to the next check point was calculated by 
adding a predetermined time in seconds to the time that the 
crew actually passed over the airfield (ATA). The measure 
of performance was derived by calculating the absolute 
difference between the crew's ETA and ATA. The unit of 
measurement was seconds.
Problem Solving Performance
Crews were instructed to obtain the most supply points 
possible by flying over four supply airfields, using only 
the airways shown on the map, and then delivering them to 
one disaster site. They could not fly over an airfield more 
than once. The total points possible for obtaining four 
disaster supplies ranged from 0 to 17 and was dependent upon 
the disaster site chosen.
Scores for problem solving performance were calculated 
by summing the points assigned to the flight path chosen. 
Higher points were indicative of better flight paths chosen 
in terms of the usefulness of the supplies at a specific 
disaster site.
Subjective Workload
The NASA TLX is the multidimensional rating scale that 
was employed as the measure of subjective workload. A 
weighted average of ratings on six subscales provides an 
overall workload rating. These subscales are: Mental
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Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Own Performance, 
Effort, and Frustration. The participants rated their 
perceived exertion on five of these subscales (except Own 
Performance) on a graded scale from "Low" to "High". The 
Own Performance scale ranges from "Good" to "Poor". The TLX 
was completed by each participant after each experimental 
scenario.
Crew Coordination
An adaptation of the Aircrew Coordination Observation 
and Evaluation (ACOE) scale (Franz et al., 1991) was used to 
measure the frequency and quality of crew coordination 
behaviors that were exhibited by crews. The scale comprises 
seven dimensions: leadership, mission analysis, situation 
awareness, assertiveness, adaptability/flexibility, and 
communication.
As previously discussed, the development of the original 
scales has been documented by several authors (e.g., Prince, 
Salas, & Franz, 1990). The original ACOE scale consisted of 
two forms: (1) a checklist on which the frequency of
observed behaviors for each dimension and crew position are 
noted, and (2) a form on which the quality of the observed 
coordination behaviors for each dimension and crew position 
is evaluated. The rating scale anchors ranged from 0 (not 
observed) to 5 (excellent).
Development of revised ACOE forms. The format of both 
the observation checklist and the dimension rating form were
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revised (see Appendices I and J). Changes made to the 
checklist were mainly cosmetic ones introduced for ease of 
administration. Only one behavior was eliminated from the 
original ACOE checklist (i.e., "conveys information 
concisely") because the behavior proved difficult to 
operationalize in the experimental setting.
In an effort to assist raters in the assessment of 
quality of crew coordination behaviors, behavioral 
indicators of the skill levels were developed for each 
dimension of crew coordination. The behavioral indicators 
were developed from specific behaviors observed during the 
experiment and an examination of the dimension definitions 
and knowledge, skills, and abilities required by the 
dimensions (McCuish & Morgan, in preparation). In addition, 
discussions were held with personnel familiar with 
coordination issues, including three pilots who participated 
in pre-tests of the scenarios. The pilots provided specific 
feedback on effective and ineffective crew coordination 
behaviors. Two of the pilots reviewed and provided 
additional feedback on the behavioral indicators and the 
examples constructed. Scores for quality of crew 
coordination skill level for each dimension ranged from 1 to 
5. Behaviors were anchored at 1, 3, and 5 as indicators of 
hardly any, adequate, and complete skill, respectively, in 
the particular dimension.
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Rater training. Two raters received 13 hours of 
training related to the experimental scenario and the ACOE 
forms. Videotapes of three crews were used as training 
aids. Two of the crews had been excluded from the 
experiment because of missing data; the third crew performed 
only in the pilot-test. The crews exhibited a full range of 
skill levels in crew coordination.
Both raters had previous experience flying the 
simulator. Rater training began with the raters receiving 
instruction on the simulator instrument panel and the 
controls required to fly the simulator. The raters then 
participated as a crew for one scenario. Afterward, they 
and the experimenter reviewed crew responsibilities, mission 
goals, and the critical events that could be expected to 
occur during each segment of flight.
The seven dimensions of crew coordination were 
introduced through a presentation of dimension definitions, 
corresponding behaviors, and specific behavioral examples. 
Examples of behaviors were then tied to critical events.
The behavioral observation form was introduced by first 
explaining the procedure to note the frequency of behaviors. 
The raters then recorded behaviors observed during each 
flight segment of a videotaped scenario presented in 20 
second intervals. The experimenter provided feedback and 
the behaviors were discussed for each time interval.
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The experimenter introduced the crew coordination rating 
scale by reviewing the dimension definitions and then 
explaining the procedure to rate the quality of crew 
coordination exhibited. Behavioral indicators of each 
dimension and related behavioral examples were presented and 
discussed (see Appendix K). The raters individually rated 
each crew member position on each dimension for the scenario 
previously shown. After the raters discussed their initial 
ratings with the experimenter, they made a final rating for 
each crew member on each dimension. The remainder of the 
training involved practice in observation of crew 
coordination behaviors and rating the behaviors observed in 
the flight scenarios of the two remaining crews.
Rating procedures. The two raters recorded the 
frequency of crew coordination behaviors on the checklist 
while observing the videotaped scenarios. The raters then 
used the behavioral summary scales to evaluate the quality 
of the crew coordination behaviors exhibited by each crew 
member for each dimension. As in training, these procedures 
led to initial ratings of crew coordination by each 
individual rater and then to final ratings of crew 
coordination as a result of rater discussion.




The interrater reliability of the crew coordination 
measures are presented first. The second and third sections 
present the analysis of the performance for flight tasks and 
the problems solving task. The analysis of subjective 
workload is presented in the fourth section, followed by the 
analysis of crew coordination in the fifth section. The 
final section presents the analyses for the relationship of 
performance and crew coordination.
Interrater Reliability of Crew Coordination Measures
The interrater reliabilities of the ACOE behavioral 
observation checklist and the behavioral summary ratings of 
crew coordination were calculated using the Pearson r 
correlation. Correlations were computed at the dimension 
level (e.g., mission analysis, leadership) for each crew 
position.
Observational checklist. Interrater reliabilties for 
frequency of behavioral observations of crew coordination 
were computed for each crew position and dimension of crew 
coordination. The Pearson r values ranged from .917 to .993 
(see Table 1).
Behavioral summary scales. Interrater reliabilties for 
the behavioral summary scales were computed for both initial 
and final ratings for each dimension of crew coordination 
and crew position. Interrater reliabilities of the initial
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ratings ranged from .540 to .851. Interrater reliabilities 
of the final ratings ranged from .912 to .991 (see Table 2).
Table 1
Interrater Reliability of Frequency of Behavioral 
Observations for the Seven Dimensions of Crew Coordination
Dimension Pilot Copilot
Mission Analysis .986 .978
Situational Awareness .950 .978






Flight performance data were collected and analyzed for 
each crew by levels of task difficulty and automation. 
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) with Tukey post hoc tests were 
utilized for these analyses. The data are summarized below 
by flight task.
Course Deviation. The crews were required to remain on 
the designated airways as closely as possible throughout 
each scenario. A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by Automation) 
mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the course deviation 
data. No effects were observed (see Table 3).
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Table 2
Interrater Reliability of Behavioral Summary Ratinas for the
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Table 3
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Course Deviation
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.0008 0.00
Automation (A) 1 0.2748 0.89
A x D 1 0.1156 0.37
Subject (D) [S(D)] 34 0.3370 NT
A x S (D) 34 0.3105 NT
NT = no test.
Altitude Deviation. A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by 
Automation) mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the altitude 
data. The analysis yielded a main effect for task 
difficulty, F(l,33) = 5.30, p < .05 (see Table 4). Altitude 
deviation in the high task difficulty condition (M = 368.34) 
was significantly greater than in the low task difficulty 
condition (M = 333.95).
A main effect was also indicated for automation,
F(l,33) = 17.21, p < .01. The mean RMS error for altitude 
deviation in the manual condition (M = 371.46) was 
significantly greater than in the automated condition (M = 
327.88). No other difference was found.
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Table 4
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Altitude Deviation
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Task Difficulty (D) 1 102702.8846 5.30* 0.00
Automation (A) 1 169756.6829 17.21** 0.00
A x D 1 4750.7226 0.48
Subject (D) [S(D)] 33 19394.2138 NT
A x S(D) 33 9861.4351 NT
* E < .05. ** g < .01; NT = no test.
Time Deviation. A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty x Automation) 
mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the time deviation data. 
The data set tended to be positively skewed; transformations 
by log, reciprocal, and square root failed to provide any 
increase in normality and power. Therefore, the analysis was 
conducted on the raw data. No significant difference was 
noted (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Time Deviation
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Task Difficulty (D) 1 344.0118 0.07
Automation (A) 1 2.3059 0.00
A x D 1 2424.8941 1.08
Subject (D) [S(D)] 32 5291.6669 NT
A x S (D) 32 2247.2750 NT
Problem Solving Performance
A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by Automation) mixed-design 
ANOVA was performed on the flight path problem solution 
data. These data were calculated by summing the points 
assigned to the flight path that was chosen. Higher points 
were indicative of better flight paths chosen in terms of 
the usefulness of the supplies that could be delivered. 
Because of the high negative skew in the supply solution 
data, these data were transformed using a reflect and 
inverse equation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). The 
transformation increased the normality of the distribution, 
but did not affect the significance of the results; 
therefore, the original data are reported.
No main effect was found; however, there was a 
significant interaction of automation by task difficulty,
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F(l,46) =5.67, p < *05. A test for simple effects revealed 
that in the high task difficulty condition, the flight paths 
chosen in the manual condition (M = 15.89) were 
significantly better than those chosen in the automated 
condition (M = 13.77), F(l,46) = 4.53, p < .05. The mean 
problem solving scores and the source of variation are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7.




Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Task Difficulty (D) 1 1.2178 0.07
Automation (A) 1 8.8741 0.92
A x D 1 54.8470 5.67* 0.04
Subject (D) [S(D)] 46 17.3442 NT
A x S(D) 46 9.6675 NT
* E < -05; NT = no test.
Table 7







Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
an = 48.
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Subjective Workload
A 2 x 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by Position by Automation) 
mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the subjective workload 
data. The analysis indicated a main effect of automation, 
F(l,86) = 8.09, p < .01) and no significant interactions 
(see Table 8). Subjective workload, as measured by the NASA 
TLX, was significantly higher in the manual condition (M = 
58.41) than in the automated condition (M = 52.75).
Table 8
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Subjective Workload
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.2634 0.00
Position (P) 1 40.2596 0.09
D x P 1 20.4540 0.05
Automation (A) 1 1444.6307 8.09** 0.03
A x D 1 8.3313 0.05
A x P 1 514.0214 2.88
A x D x P 1 97.6909 0.55
Subject (D X P) 
[S(D x P) ]
86 447.3665 NT
A x S(D x P) 86 178.6422 NT
** E < .01.
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Subscale analyses. The subjective workload data were 
analyzed further by conducting a 2 x 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty 
by Position by Automation) mixed-design ANOVA on each of the 
six TLX subscales. Significant differences were found 
within two workload subscales, physical demand and effort.
The analysis of the physical demand workload subscale 
revealed two main effects of automation and position, F(l, 
87) = 16.56, E  < .05, and F(l,87) = 33.23, E < *05, 
respectively. The mean physical demand workload in the 
manual condition (M = 54.07) was significantly greater than 
the automated condition (M = 39.12). The mean physical 
demand workload of the pilot (M = 55.49) was significantly 
greater than the copilot's mean workload (M = 37.42).
The analysis of the physical demand subscale also 
revealed a significant interaction of automation and 
position, F(l,87) =25.48, e < -05. A test for simple 
effects indicated significant differences in physical demand 
workload for position in the manual condition, F(l,140) = 
58.47, e < *05. The physical demand of the pilots (M = 
69.46) was significantly greater than the copilots (M = 
38.35) in the manual condition. Also, physical demand for 
the pilot differed significantly between the two levels of 
automation, F(l,87) = 58.48, e < *05- The mean physical 
demand workload was greater for the pilot in the manual 
condition than in the automated condition (M = 41.52).
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The analysis for the effort subscale revealed a 
significant main effect of automation, F(l,87) = 7.11, p < 
.05. The perception of effort as a source of workload was 
greater in the manual condition (M = 69.94) than in the 
automated condition (M = 62.86). The sources of variation 
for the two workload subscales that were significant are 
presented in Table 9.
Table 9
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for the Workload 
Subscales of Physical Demand and Effort
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Physical Demand
Task Difficulty (D) 1 1464.5071 1.63
Position (P) 1 14844.3312 16.56** 0.11
P x D 1 67.4626 0.08
Automation (A) 1 10089.2773 33.23** 0.07
A x D 1 776.8933 2.56
A x P 1 7735.2225 25.48** 0.06
A x D x P 1 818.2953 2.70
Subject (D x P) 87 896.4413 NT
[S(D x P)]
A x S (D x P) 87 303.5854 NT
** P < .01.
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Table 9 (continued)
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for the Workload 
Subscales of Physical Demand and Effort
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Effort
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.0025 0.00
Position (P) 1 89.8657 0.13
P x D 1 0.4666 0.00
Automation (A) 1 2265.6351 7.11* 0.02
A x D 1 44.1891 0.14
A x P 1 311.2873 0.98
A x D x P 1 33.8081 0.11
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
87 706.7816 NT
A x S(D x P) 87 318.5257 NT
* E < .05.
Crew Coordination
The crew coordination behaviors were analyzed in terms 
of two measures: the frequency per minute of observed crew 
coordination behaviors and the behavioral ratings of the 
quality of crew coordination exhibited.
Frequency per minute of crew coordination behaviors. A 
2 x 2  (Automation by Task Difficulty) mixed-design ANOVA was 
conducted to identify differences in the length of the 
scenarios among conditions. A significant main effect was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
revealed for task difficulty, F(l,43) = 14.14, p < .01. The 
length of flight in seconds in the high difficulty condition 
(M = 3530.02) was significantly longer than in the low 
difficulty condition (M = 3270.59) (approximately 4 minutes 
19 seconds longer). For this reason, the frequency data 
were converted to a measure of frequency of crew 
coordination behaviors per minute to overcome differences in 
the opportunity to display coordination behaviors.
First, frequency data were obtained from the ACOE 
behavioral observation checklist. The frequency of 
behaviors for each crew position was calculated by summing 
the individual crew coordination behaviors within each 
dimension for the entire scenario.
The frequency per minute was determined by summing the 
frequency of behaviors occurring within each dimension and 
dividing by the duration of scenario. Frequency per minute 
was calculated for pilot and copilot. These data were then 
submitted to the following analyses to identify differences 
in the frequency per minute of coordination behaviors among 
levels of automation and task difficulty and between crew 
positions for each dimension.
A 2 x 2 x 2 (Automation by Task Difficulty by Position) 
mixed-design ANOVA was conducted for each of the seven crew 
coordination dimensions. A significant main effect for 
automation was revealed for mission analysis, F(l, 92) = 
10.56, p < .01. Mission analysis behaviors occurred more
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frequently in the automated condition (M = .052 per minute) 
than in the manual condition (M = .040 per minute). No 
other difference was found for mission analysis.
A significant main effect for automation was also found 
for decision making F(l, 92) =4.19, p < .05. More decision 
making behaviors were exhibited during the automated 
condition (M = .019 per minute) than during the manual 
condition (M = .016 per minute). No other difference was 
found.
A significant main effect for position was revealed for 
situation awareness, F(l, 92) = 20.31, p < .01. The copilot 
displayed more situation awareness coordination behaviors (M 
= .082 per minute) than the pilot (M = .041 per minute). No 
other difference was noted for situation awareness.
The analysis for the leadership dimension revealed 
significant main effects of position, F(l,92) = 11.86, p < 
.01, automation, F(l,92) = 19.43, p < .01. The pilot 
exhibited more leadership behaviors (M = .119 per minute) 
than the copilot (M = .065 per minute). Significantly more 
leadership behaviors were exhibited in the automated 
condition (M = .105 per minute) than in the manual condition 
(M = .079 per minute). A significant interaction of 
position by automation was also indicated, F(l,92) = 24.79, 
p < .01. A test for simple effects indicated that the pilot 
displayed significantly more leadership behaviors in the 
automated condition (M = .148 per minute) than in the manual
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condition (M = .091 per minute), F(l,92) = 24.92, p < .01. 
Additionally, the pilot displayed significantly more 
leadership behaviors in the automated condition than the 
copilot (M = .063 per minute), F(1,118) = 44.14, p < .01.
No other difference was observed for the leadership 
dimension.
The analysis for frequency per minute of assertiveness 
behaviors revealed a significant effect of position, F(l,
92) = 24.56, p < .01, and automation, F(l,92) = 6.59, p < 
.01. The pilot exhibited more assertiveness behaviors (M = 
.142 per minute) than the copilot (M = .078 per minute). 
Coordination behaviors for the assertiveness dimension 
occurred significantly more frequently in the automated 
condition (M = .117 per minute) than in the manual condition 
(M = .102 per minute). A test for simple effects indicated 
that the pilot displayed significantly more assertiveness 
behaviors in the automated condition, (M = .142 per minute) 
than the copilot (M = .092 per minute), F(l,128) = 12.57, p 
< .01. The pilot also displayed significantly more 
assertiveness behaviors (M = .141 per minute) than the 
copilot (M = .064 per minute) in the manual condition,
F(1,128) = 30.20, p < .01. In addition, the copilot 
displayed significantly more assertiveness behaviors during 
the automated condition than in the manual condition,
F(1,92) = 12.20, p < .01.
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A significant main effect of position was revealed for 
the communication dimension, F(l,92) = 11.94, p < .01. The 
copilot displayed significantly more communication behaviors 
(M = .486 per minute) than the pilot (M = .347 per minute). 
An additional main effect, automation, was revealed for 
communication behaviors, F(l,92) = 6.86, p < .01. 
Significantly more communication behaviors occurred in the 
automated condition (M = .436 per minute) than in the manual 
condition (M = .396 per minute). No other significant 
difference was found for the communication dimension. 
Finally, the analysis for the adaptability/flexibility 
dimension at the position level revealed no significant 
differences. The sources of variation for freguency per 
minute of the seven dimensions of crew coordination are 
presented in Table 10.
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Table 10
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for Frecruencv Per Minute
bv Dimension of Crew Coordination
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Mission Analysis
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.58 0.50
Position (P) 1 1.83 1.58
P x D 1 0.59 0.51
Automation (A) 1 6.67 10.56** 0.10
A x D 1 1.05 1.66
A x P 1 0.61 0.96
A x D x P 1 0.00 0.01
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
92 1.16 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.63 NT
** E < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Situational Awareness
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.06 0.01
Position (P) 1 81.73 20.31** 0.15
P x D 1 0.08 0.02
Automation (A) 1 0.02 0.02
A x D 1 0.08 0.09
A x P 1 1.49 1.58
A x D x P 1 0.29 0.31
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
92 4.02 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.94 NT
** E < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Decision Makincr
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.00 0.00
Position (P) 1 0.98 3.35
P x D 1 0.25 0.85
Automation (A) 1 0.55 4.19* 0.01
A x D 1 0.01 0.11
A x P 1 0.27 2 .05
A x D x P 1 0.02 0.12
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
92 0.29 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.13 NT
* E < -05.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Leadership
Task Difficulty (D) 1 3.16 0.26
Position (P) 1 141.82 11.86** 0.10
P x D 1 7.29 0.61
Automation (A) 1 33.61 19.43** 0.02
A x D 1 0.27 0.15
A x P 1 42.87 24.79** 0.03
A x D x P 1 0.50 0.29
Subject (D x P) 92 11.96 NT
[S(D x P)]
A x S (D x P) 92 1.73 NT
** E < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Assertiveness
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.24 0.03
Position (P) 1 193.43 24.56** 0.18
P x D 1 3.43 0.44
Automation (A) 1 10.52 6.59** 0.01
A x D 1 0.49 0.31
A x P 1 9.05 5.67* 0.01
A x D x P 1 0.37 0.23
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
92 7.87 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 1.60 NT
* E < •05. ** e < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Adaotabilitv/Flexibilitv
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.05 0.27
Position (P) 1 0.08 0.42
P x D 1 0.12 0.62
Automation (A) 1 0.16 3.31
A x D 1 0.12 2.44
A x P 1 0.16 3.27
A x D x P 1 0.01 0.17
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.20 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.05 NT
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (concluded)
Source of Variation df Mean Square1 F Eta Square
Communication
Task Difficulty (D) 1 296.89 3.87
Position (P) 1 916.86 11.94** 0.10
P x D 1 6.34 0.08
Automation (A) 1 77.12 6.86** 0.01
A x D 1 0.27 0.02
A x P 1 34.88 3.10
A x D x P 1 0.44 0.04
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
92 76.77 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 11.25 NT
** g < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
Behavioral ratings of crew coordination dimensions and 
overall crew coordination. Ratings for the seven dimensions 
of crew coordination were calculated by averaging the final 
behavioral summary ratings of the raters for both pilot and 
copilot separately. These data were submitted to the 
following analyses to identify differences between ratings 
of crew coordination quality among levels of automation and 
task difficulty and between crew position.
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A 2 x 2 x 2 (Automation by Task Difficulty by 
Position) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted for each of the 
seven crew coordination dimensions. A significant main 
effect for position was revealed for mission analysis, F(l, 
92) =4.77, p < .03. The mission analysis behaviors of the 
copilot was rated significantly higher (M = 2.92) than the 
pilot's rating (M = 2.60). No other difference was found 
for mission analysis.
A significant main effect of position was also revealed
for situation awareness, F(l, 92) = 6.86, p < .01. Again,
situation awareness of the copilot was rated significantly 
better (M = 2.98) than the pilot's rating (M = 2.64). No 
other difference was noted for situation awareness.
A significant main effect of position for communication
was revealed, F(l,92) = 6.54, p < .01. As with mission
analysis and situation awareness, the communication of the 
copilot was rated significantly higher (M = 3.16) than the 
pilot's rating (M = 2.80). An additional main effect, 
automation, was revealed for communication, F(l, 92) = 5.73, 
P  <  .02. Coordination behaviors for the communication 
dimension were rated higher in the automated condition (M = 
3.04) than in the manual condition (M = 2.92).
A significant main effect of automation for decision 
making was revealed, F(l,92) = 8.22, p < .01. Coordination 
behaviors for the decision making dimension received higher 
ratings in the automated condition (M = 2.80) than in the
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manual condition (M = 2.65). No other significant 
difference was found for decision making.
The analysis for the leadership dimension revealed a 
significant interaction of position by automation, F(l,92) = 
7.87, p < .01. A test for simple effects indicated that the 
quality of pilot leadership was rated significantly higher 
in the automated condition (M = 2.69) than in the manual 
condition (M = 2.46), F(l,92) = 7.99, p < .01. No other 
difference was observed.
The analysis for the assertiveness dimension of crew 
coordination revealed a significant effect of automation,
F(1, 92) = 5.51, p < .02. Coordination behaviors for the 
assertiveness dimension were rated significantly higher in 
the automated condition (M = 3.05) than in the manual 
condition (M = 2.94). No other difference was revealed for 
assertiveness. Finally, the analysis of the 
adaptability/flexibility dimension revealed no significant 
difference. The sources of variation for ratings of crew 
coordination are presented in Table 11.
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Table 11
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for Dimension Ratings of
Crew Coordination Quality
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Mission Analysis
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.0208 0.02
Position (P) 1 5.0052 4.77*
P x D 1 0.1302 0.12
Automation (A) 1 0.3333 1.56
A x D 1 0.1875 0.87
A x P 1 0.2552 1.19
A x P x D 1 0.2552 1.19
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 1.0497 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.2143 NT
* E  < *05.
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Table 11 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Situational Awareness
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.0469 0.06
Position (P) 1 5.6719 6.86** 0.06
P x D 1 0.1302 0.16
Automation (A) 1 0.0469 0.28
A x D 1 0.1302 0.79
A x P 1 0.6302 3.82
A x D x P 1 0.0052 0.03
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.8263 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.1651 NT
** E < -01.
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Table 11 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Decision Makincr
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.2552 0.30
Position (P) 1 1.6875 1.97
P x D 1 0.1875 0.22
Automation (A) 1 1.1719 8.22** 0.01
A x P 1 0.1875 1.32
A x D 1 0.0052 0.04
A x D x P 1 0.0208 0.15
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.8559 NT
A x S (D x P) 92 0.1426 NT
** E < .01.
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Table 11 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Leadership
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.8138 0.95
Position (P) 1 0.0117 0.01
P x D 1 0.0117 0.01
Automation (A) 1 0.2200 1.38
A x P 1 1.2513 7.87** 0.01
A x D 1 0.0326 0.20
A x D x P 1 0.0013 0.01
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.8537 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.1589 NT
** E < *01.
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Table 11 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Assertiveness
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.3333 0.50
Position (P) 1 0.0052 0.01
P x D 1 0.0833 0.12
Automation (A) 1 0.5208 5.51* 0.02
A x P 1 0.1875 1.98
A x D 1 0.0469 0.50
A x D x P 1 0.0469 0.50
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.6693 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.0945 NT
* E < *05.
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Table 11 (continued)
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Adaotabilitv/Flexibilitv
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.1576 0.29
Position (P) 1 0.9492 1.75
P x D 1 0.2930 0.54
Automation (A) 1 0.0013 0.01
A x P 1 0.0638 0.56
A x D 1 0.1055 0.93
A x D x P 1 0.0326 0.29
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.5422 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.1133 NT
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Table 11 (concluded)
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Communication
Task Difficulty (D) 1 1.1719 1.27
Position (P) 1 6.0208 6.54** 0.06
P x D 1 0.0469 0.05
Automation (A) 1 0.7500 5.73* 0.01
A x D 1 0.0052 0.04
A x P 1 0.1875 1.43
A x D x P 1 0.0052 0.04
Subject (D x P) 
[S(D x P)]
92 0.9204 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.1310 NT
* E < .05. ** e < .01.
Overall Rating of Crew Coordination Quality
Overall ratings of crew coordination quality for each 
crew position were calculated by averaging the behavioral 
summary ratings across the seven dimensions of crew 
coordination. A 2 x 2 x 2 (Position by Automation by Task 
Difficulty) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on the quality 
of crew coordination ratings. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of automation, F(l,92) = 5.80, e < 
.05 (see Table 12). The overall rating of crew coordination
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was higher in the automated condition (M = 2.85) than in the 
manual condition (M = 2.77).
A significant interaction of automation by position was 
also found F(l,92) =5.80, p < .05. A test for simple 
effects indicated that the overall crew coordination ratings 
for the pilots were rated higher in the automated condition 
(M = 2.80) than in the manual condition (M = 2.63), F(l,92) 
=5.82, p < .02. There were no significant differences 
between the copilot ratings nor between the pilot and the 
copilot.
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Table 12
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Overall Rating of
Crew Coordination Quality
Source of Variation df Mean Square F Eta Square
Task Difficulty (D) 1 0.2552 0.47
Position (P) 1 1.8520 3.39
P x D 1 0.0086 0.02
Automation (A) 1 0.3215 5.80* 0.01
A x P 1 0.3215 5.80* 0.01
A x D 1 0.0038 0.07
A X  D X  P 1 0.0004 0.01
Subject (D x P) 
[S (D x P) ]
92 0.5460 NT
A x S(D x P) 92 0.0554 NT
* p < *05.
Task Performance and Crew Coordination
Two series of stepwise multiple regression analyses 
were conducted using the measures of flight performance and 
problem solving as the dependent variables. The first 
analyses investigated the relationship of the performance 
measures with the observed frequencies of the seven crew 
coordination dimensions for pilot and copilot. The second 
series investigated the relationship of the performance 
measures with the behavioral summary ratings of the seven
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crew coordination dimensions. These analyses were conducted 
for both levels of automation.
Relationship of task performance and frequency of crew 
coordination behaviors. The frequencies of two crew 
coordination dimensions were predictive of altitude 
deviation (see Table 13). The frequency of the copilot's 
situation awareness behaviors accounted for 15% of the 
altitude deviation variance in the manual condition. As the 
frequency of the copilot's situation awareness behaviors 
increased, mean altitude deviation increased. In the 
automated condition, the frequency of the assertiveness 
behaviors of the copilot predicted 10% of the variance. As 
the frequency of the copilot's assertiveness behaviors 
increased, mean altitude deviation increased.
Analysis of mean course deviation in the manual 
condition indicated a main effect for the frequency of the 
pilot's situation awareness behaviors. As the number of the 
pilot's situation awareness behaviors increased, mean course 
deviation increased. No effect for frequency was found for 
course deviation in the automated condition. The regression 
analysis for mean time deviation indicated no main effect in 
either condition.
Analysis of the final dependent variable, problem 
solving, indicated a significant main effect for the 
frequency of the decision making behaviors of the copilot in 
automated flight. As the frequency of the copilot's
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decision making behaviors decreased, the problem solving 
scores improved. Table 13 provides a summary of the 
significant effects of the regression analyses for frequency 
of crew coordination behaviors.
Table 13
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analyses for Frequency Using 
Mean Altitude Deviation. Course Deviation, and Problem 
Solving as the Dependent Variables





















.095 -.308 4.81 1,46
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Relationship of task performance and ratings of crew
coordination quality. The variance of mean time deviation 
was accounted for by ratings of crew coordination quality 
during both levels of automation (see Table 14). Ratings of 
the pilot's mission analysis and leadership, and the 
copilot's communication explained 25% of the variance for 
time deviation in the manual condition. Mean time deviation 
increased in relation to increases in the ratings of the 
pilot's mission analysis behaviors and to decreases in the 
ratings of the copilot's communication and the pilot's 
leadership behaviors. Similarily in the automated 
condition, ratings of the pilot's leadership and 
assertiveness, and the copilot's communication explained 29% 
of the variance for time deviation. Again, mean time 
deviation increased in relation to decreases in the ratings 
of the copilot's communication and the pilot's leadership 
behaviors; however, as the ratings of the pilot's 
assertiveness behaviors increased, mean time deviation 
increased likewise.
Altitude deviation was explained by ratings of the 
pilots's situation awareness in the manual condition.
Better ratings of the pilot's situation awareness were 
related to less mean altitude deviation. No dimension of 
crew coordination was predictive of altitude deviation in 
the automated condition.
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Course deviation in the manual condition was explained 
by ratings of the copilots's mission analysis (20%) ; 
however, in the automated condition two dimensions of crew 
coordination for the pilot explained 18% of the variance: 
mission analysis and situation awareness. In the manual 
condition, increases in mean course deviation were 
associated with poorer mission analysis behaviors of the 
copilot. In the automated condition, increases in mean 
course deviation were associated with better mission 
analysis behaviors of the pilot, and better ratings of 
situation awareness for the pilot.
Finally, ratings of two crew coordination dimensions 
for the copilot were predictive of problem solving: the
copilot's situation awareness in the manual condition and 
mission analysis in the automated condition. In the manual 
condition, better ratings of situation awareness for the 
copilot were associated with better problem solving 
performance. In the automated condition, better problem 
solving performance was associated with higher ratings of 
mission analysis for the copilot. These results are 
summarized in Table 14.
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Table 14
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analyses for Rating Using
I_----- ■*■ •‘•"‘— ■I..
the Dependent Variables
___?■*.*









- Pilot 2 .177 .574 4.74 2,44
Leadership 
- Pilot 3 .248 -.380 4.72 3,43
Communication 




- Pilot 2 .198 .653 5.57 2,45
Leadership 
- Pilot 3 .293 -.466 6.07 3,44
Altitude Deviation
Situation Awareness 
- Pilot 1 .162
Manual
-.402 8.86 1,46
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Table 14 (concluded)
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.274 .524 17.38 1,46
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire
A questionnaire administered at the end of the 
experiment solicited the participants' opinions about the 
experiment and their experience with cockpit resourse 
management (CRM) training. The participants indicated that 
they felt the scenarios were moderately to very 
representative of how aircraft might be used in response to 
emergency situations (M = 5.23). Both the flight 
performance and the decision making requirements of the 
scenarios were felt to reflect very accurately issues 
important in aviation, (M = 6.14 and M = 6.05, 
respectively). Additionally, the participants indicated 
that the practice received during the training scenario was 
very adequate (M = 5.87).
A related samples t-test was conducted between the 
responses to Questions 5 and 6. These questions asked about 
the extent to which the participant became complacent during 
the automated and manual conditions. The participants 
indicated that they were significantly more complacent (t = 
8.09, p < .05) in the automated condition (M = 4.02, 
"moderately complacent") than in the manual condition (M = 
2.18, "somewhat complacent"). No difference was noted 
between pilot and copilot in either condition.
The final two questions concerned the amount of CRM 
training the participant had experienced previously. Only 
47% of the participants indicated they had received any
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previous training. Chi-square tests for independence 
revealed no relationship between CRM training for either 
pilots or copilots and levels of task difficulty, X2 = *49/ 
X2 = .06, df = 1, respectively, nor any difference between 
crew position, x2 = 1*58, df = 1.
Summary
This investigation revealed an interesting, but complex 
array of results. The following sections provide a global 
summary of the findings.
Interrater reliability. Interrater reliabilities were 
within acceptable levels for both the crew coordination 
observation and behavioral summary scales. Reliabilities 
ranged from .917 to .993 for the observation scales and from 
.912 to .971 for the final rating made on the behavioral 
summary scales.
Crew coordination. ANOVA results for the frequency per 
minute of crew coordination behaviors indicated significant 
effects as follows: (1) a crew position effect for the
dimensions of situation awareness, leadership, 
assertiveness, and communication, (2) an automation effect 
for the dimensions of mission analysis, decision making, 
leadership, assertiveness, and communication, and (3) an 
automation by position effect for leadership and 
assertiveness. ANOVA results for the behavioral summary 
ratings of crew coordination quality revealed the following: 
(1) a crew position effect for mission analysis, situation
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awareness, and communication, (2) an automation effect for 
decision making, assertiveness, communication, and overall 
crew coordination.
The results of the regression analyses indicated that 
several dimensions of the frequency of behavioral 
observations and ratings of crew coordination behaviors were 
predictive of task performance, although the dimensions 
varied according to level of automation; however, the 
behavioral ratings indicated a stronger effect than 
frequency. Altitude deviation was predicted by the 
frequency of situation awareness of the copilot in the 
manual condition and the assertiveness of the copilot in the 
automated condition. In the automated condition, course 
deviation was predicted by the frequency of situation 
awareness behaviors of the pilot; problem solving 
performance by the frequency of decision making of the 
copilot.
The relationship of task performance and the behavioral 
summary ratings for crew coordination is summarized below. 
Time deviation was predicted by ratings of the communication 
of the copilot, and mission analysis and leadership of the 
pilot in the manual condition, and by the communication of 
the copilot, and leadership and assertiveness of the pilot 
in the automated condition. Altitude deviation was 
predicted by ratings of the situation awareness of the 
pilot. Course deviation was predicted by ratings of the
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mission analysis of the copilot in the manual condition and 
by the mission analysis and situation awareness of the pilot 
in the automated condition. Problem solving performance was 
predicted by the situation awareness in the manual condition 
and mission analysis of the copilot in the automated 
condition.
Task performance. The only flight performance measure 
affected by level of automation was altitude deviation. 
Altitude deviation was greater in the manual condition, and 
also in the high difficulty condition. Problem solving 
performance was better in the manual high difficulty 
condition than in the automated high difficulty condition.
Subjective workload. The subjective workload reported 
by the crews was lower in the automated condition. In 
addition, pilots reported higher physical demand workload in 
the automated condition, and both crew members reported 
greater effort as a source of workload in the automated 
condition.
Opinion and experience data. The participants 
indicated a general level of satisfaction with the 
representativeness of the scenarios, performance 
requirements, and adequacy of the training. They indicated 
that they felt more complacent during automated flight.
No differences was found in the amount of CRM training 
previously received by the participants.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The purposes of this research were two-fold: (1) to
assess the reliability and utility of the ACOE scales in 
decribing the crew coordination behaviors displayed during 
flight and (2) to examine the effects automation and task 
difficulty on crew coordination, workload, and performance. 
Two levels of automation were investigated: an autopilot
that featured an attitude, altitude, and navigation hold and 
no autopilot. It was hypothesized that in the automated 
condition, performance would be better, subjective workload 
lower, differences in the frequency of crew coordination 
behaviors would occur, and no differences would appear in 
relation to the quality of coordination performance 
exhibited. Additionally, two levels of task difficulty were 
investigated: the presence of wind and turbulence and the
absence of environmental influences. It was hypothesized 
that performance would be better and workload would be lower 
in the low task difficulty condition, differences in 
frequency of crew coordination behaviors would transpire, 
and no difference would appear in relation to the quality of 
coordination performance exhibited.
Overview
An interesting pattern of results emerged from this low 
fidelity investigation of automation. The participants 
reported less workload in the automated mode of flight.
Yet, flight performance, for all intents and purposes was
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not enhanced to any great extent. In addition, the flight 
paths developed for the problem solving task were 
significantly worse in the automated, high difficulty 
condition than in the manual, high difficulty condition. 
During the automated condition, crew coordination behaviors 
occurred more frequently. Also, crew coordination 
performance was better for four of the seven dimensions and 
for the overall rating of crew coordination. Finally, 
support for a relationship between performance and quality 
of crew coordination behaviors was evidenced. The following 
discussion will examine these results in detail and 
interpret them within the context of the hypotheses 
previously generated and related research findings.
Flight Performance
Contrary to hypothesis and the past findings of Wickens 
et al. (1989), with the exception of altitude deviation, 
automation had little effect on the three flight performance 
measures. Although the flight performance measures of 
altitude, course, and time deviation were realistic in 
relation to the specific requirements of the mission, the 
latter two measures were perhaps too gross for a difference 
in performance to be detected. In addition, staying on 
course and arriving on time appear to be more influenced by 
factors outside of the direct control of the autopilot. For 
example, the autopilot has no direct link to the speed of 
the plane, speed being under the control of the pilot;
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however, it could be argued that the use of the autopilot 
could allow the crew members to pay more attention to the 
calculation and adjustment of airspeed. Likewise, although 
the navigation feature of the autopilot enabled the aircraft 
to lock on to the selected VOR, the observation of the 
experimenter suggested that the benefit of this feature 
appeared to be more governed by the method of its 
utilization by the crews than was altitude.
It is also possible that the use of a higher level of 
automation or several additional levels of automation, as 
Sheridan's taxonomy of computer aiding (1991) outlines, 
would have further delineated any effects of automation.
The use of other levels of automation, such as the system 
offering advice but performing no actions, in addition to a 
wider range of performance measures, (e.g., severity of 
errors, timeliness and accuracy of radio calls), may have 
indicated performance differences not highlighted by the 
current measures.
As found with the automation manipulation, altitude 
deviation was also the only one of the three measures of 
flight performance affected by task difficulty. The wind 
and turbulence present in the high difficulty scenario 
appeared to increase altitude deviation over that present in 
the low difficulty scenario. This finding was anticipated 
in light of the effects of turbulence on aircraft handling 
in general. However, the lack of a significant effect on
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course and time deviations may be related to the 
participants' general aviation skill training.
Subjective Workload
The results of the NASA TLX analyses indicate that 
subjective workload was perceived to be lower in the 
scenarios in which automation was available. A closer 
examination of the workload subscales revealed that the 
sources of workload affected by level of automation were 
physical demand and effort. The pilots reported more 
physical demand when flying without the autopilot. A 
contrast between pilot and copilot responsibilities was 
shown by the higher rating of physical demand made by the 
pilots than the copilots in the manual condition. These 
results indicate that the autopilot achieved some of its 
designed intent; that is, automation provided at least 
subjective relief from some of the demands of the mission.
Individual participants, regardless of crew position, 
indicated that their own effort, as a source of workload, 
was lower in the automated condition. This finding suggests 
that even though the bulk of the physical demand fell on the 
pilot, both crew members felt that they had to work harder 
mentally and physically to accomplish their own level of 
performance in the manual condition.
Analyses of the remaining workload subscales (i.e., 
temporal demand, mental demand, performance, and frustration 
revealed no difference between level of automation for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
either crew position. The absence of differences among 
these subscales suggests again that the primary end of the 
autopilot was a reduction in the physical demand placed on 
the pilot and perhaps an overall reduction in the general 
level of effort exerted by the crew.
No difference in subjective workload was found in 
relation to task difficulty. As with the measures of flight 
performance, it appears that the wind and turbulence did not 
sufficiently tax the skills of the crew members (pilots in 
particular) to produce significant reports of workload 
inequality between levels of task difficulty.
The automation effect on workload supports the stated 
research hypothesis and the findings reported by Wickens et 
al. (1989). Wiener et al. (1991), however, found the 
opposite; that is, in a simulator study comparing a 
traditional DC-9 and the glass cockpit of the MD-88, the 
first officers, rather than the captains, reported more 
workload. In addition, the advanced technology crews 
reported higher physical demand for the first officer and 
higher frustration for both crew members. The disparity in 
results may be explained in part by the differences in the 
amount of experience in the aircraft. DC-9 crews had 
significantly more time (i.e., both months and hours) in 
their aircraft than did the crews in the advanced aircraft 
(30.4 months vs 9.5). The difference in the crews' 
familiarity with flight systems and possibly in new task
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requirements placed on the first officer in the advanced 
system suggest a possible bias on the basis of experience in 
favor of the traditional cockpit.
Problem Solving
Automation did not produce better decisions about the 
optimal flight path to take in either level of task 
difficulty. In fact, when wind and turbulence were present, 
more optimal flight paths were developed during manual 
rather than automated flight. The failure of automation to 
improve the flight path chosen is somewhat surprising, 
especially in the higher difficulty setting where 
automation, at first glance, would logically seem to be most 
helpful. Given the reported advantages of automation and 
reduced reports of workload, this finding is intuitively 
perplexing. Because the crews experienced less workload in 
the automated condition, one might hypothesize that more of 
their "resources" would have been available for other 
activities, such as planning and problem resolution.
This hypothesis is supported by the increased number of 
mission analysis and decision making behaviors exhibited 
during automated flight. However, the occurrence of more 
coordination behaviors did not produce better flight path 
solutions. And as previously noted, mental demand, such as 
that might have been created by the need to develop a flight 
plan to obtain and deliver the optimal supplies, showed no 
apparent decrease in the automated condition.
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One viable explanation involves the notion of 
complacency, which has been described as an attitude that 
"modulates our probabilities in responding" (Wiener, 1981, 
p. 118). Complacency, defined as an attitude, is not 
measured easily, does not necessarily produce observable 
negative results, and therefore is most likely to be 
measured only subjectively. Wiener suggested that 
complacency be viewed as "a conscious or subconscious 
relaxation of one's usual standards in exercising judgement, 
in selecting strategies, and in making decisions" p. 118.
Give consideration, then, to the automated condition in 
which the aircraft generally required much less active 
flying. During this condition the workload derived 
specifically from physical demand and overall effort was 
decreased; in addition, the crews reported a higher degree 
of complacency. The resultant complacency, particularly 
that which occurred in the high task difficulty condition 
as the autopilot handled a more difficult environmental 
condition for the crew, may have placed the crews at risk to 
accept less than optimal flight path solutions in spite of 
an increased number of coordination behaviors. (The 
frequency of crew coordination behaviors is discussed in 
more detail in the next section).
Anecdotal support for the complacency rationale is 
frequently cited by researchers and pilots alike. The 
primary theme of complacency involves an individual or crew
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feeling familiar and perhaps overly comfortable with a 
situation, sometimes to the detriment of the situation. The 
analysis of the problem solving task, in conjunction with 
reports of lower workload and higher complacency, provide 
additional evidence of the potentially debilitating effects 
of complacency.
Crew Coordination
Many have contended that the nature of coordination may 
differ among increasingly automated flight systems because 
of the changes that automation impose on flight tasks, and 
eventually on the roles and interactions of the crew 
members. This contention is supported by one of the more 
notable findings of this investigation that demonstrates a 
difference in the frequency per minute of coordination 
behaviors observed between levels of automation. Crews 
during automated flight exhibited a higher frequency of 
coordination behaviors of mission analysis, decision making, 
leadership, and communication. Apparently energy (i.e., 
resources) not spent in direct control of the aircraft was 
directed to more overt interaction between crew members. In 
contrast, crews in manual flight displayed almost no 
decrease in overall flight performance, but significantly 
less coordination behaviors.
Kleinman and Serfaty (1989) reported similar results 
when examining adaptive team coordination strategies. Under 
low to moderate levels of workload, team members coordinated
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their actions and resource sharing in an explicit manner. 
However as workload increased, performance was maintained, 
but the coordination strategy changed to an implicit one in 
which crew members responded to unsolicited reguests for 
assistance and communication was greatly reduced.
The lack of performance differences in light of the 
increased coordination behaviors may be partially explained 
by the conclusions of Williges, Johnston, & Briggs (1966). 
After noting divergent effects of communication on team 
performance, they suggested that when a task does not 
require, but rather allows communication, then crew 
communication may seem "little more than an unnecessary and 
rather tempting luxury that has relatively little impact on 
teamwork" p. 477. Similarly, if automated flight permitted 
the opportunity for more coordination behaviors that were 
not essential for the maintenance of safety and performance 
standards, the increase in coordination behaviors may have 
been superfluous. It is conceivable that the level of 
automation present in this investigation permitted more 
explicit coordination behaviors, when possibly only implicit 
behaviors were needed.
Brown, Boff, and Swierenga (1991) bring a slightly 
different perspective to the explanation for increased 
coordination behaviors in the automated condition. They 
suggest that if automated systems reduce control actions 
(e.g., pushing or pulling), the implicit communication of a
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crew member's present knowledge and intent to other crew 
members may also be reduced. Therefore, it may be 
hypothesized that more explicit coordination behaviors may 
be needed in increasingly advanced cockpits to convey the 
information that was previously conveyed by a push, pull, or 
a look.
Other differences in the distribution of coordination 
behaviors occurred in relation to crew members. In support 
of Norman & Orlady's (1988a) proposal concerning changes in 
the role of pilots, the pilots in this investigation assumed 
more of a managerial role as shown by increased leadership 
behaviors (i.e., directing, organizing, and supporting) in 
the automated condition. Additionally, copilots became more 
assertive, taking a more active role in offering unsolicited 
opinions and admitting uncertainty during automated flight.
Differences between the ratings of crew coordination 
quality were also observed, although none was hypothesized. 
When differences were noted, the ratings favored the 
automated condition. Coordination behaviors displayed 
during automated flight were rated higher for the dimensions 
of decision making, assertiveness, and communication. The 
overall rating of crew coordination quality also revealed a 
higher rating in automated condition; however, only the 
pilots received significantly higher overall ratings.
These results are somewhat contrary to the report of 
Wiener et al. (1991) who found that overall CRM performance
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was either the same or slightly higher (dependent on the 
rater) in the traditional aircraft. Again, differences in 
time in aircraft may have biased those findings. In 
contrast, Clothier (1991) found that CRM performance was 
better in advanced technology aircraft when LOFt scenarios 
were used.
Although differences between the coordination behaviors 
of the two crew members were not hypothesized, the analysis 
of the frequency per minute and rating of crew coordination 
behaviors indicated differences in the responsibilities of 
the individual crew members. Regardless of the level of 
automation, the copilot displayed more situation awareness 
and communication behaviors than did the pilot, and the 
pilot exhibited more assertiveness behaviors. In the 
automated condition only, the pilot displayed more 
leadership behaviors than the copilot. Surprisingly, the 
copilot received higher coordination ratings than the pilot 
for situation awareness, mission analysis, and communication 
behaviors across conditions. These results suggest that 
some of the responsibilities of the crew members may remain 
stable and the copilot may be in a better position to 
display overt coordination actions regardless of automation 
level.
Performance and Crew Coordination
The analysis of the relationship between frequency of 
crew coordination behaviors and task performance indicated
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that the frequency with which crew coordination behaviors 
occurred explained small, but significant amounts of 
variance in the performance measures. Three coordination 
dimensions (e.g, the number of the copilot's situation 
awareness behaviors) were significantly predictive, 
explaining 10 to 15% of the variance of three of the four 
performance measures. However, in this investigation it 
appears that the increased frequency of situation awareness 
and assertiveness behaviors were indicative of deviations in 
flight performance and thus perhaps were performance-driven 
behaviors, as Straus & Cooper (1989) suggested in their 
analysis of communication frequency. Likewise, the negative 
relationship of the frequency of decision making behaviors 
of the copilot and problem solving scores suggests that the 
decision making behaviors may have been symptomatic of 
difficulties in determining the most optimal flight path.
The analysis of the ratings of crew coordination 
indicated a stronger effect on task performance than did 
frequency. Quality ratings of coordination accounted for 16 
to 29% of the variance in performance. Unfortunately, 
explanations for the direction of the relationships are not 
intuitive. For example, task performance was typically 
negatively associated with ratings of crew coordination 
behaviors for the pilot, but was positively associated with 
ratings for the copilot.
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In the manual condition, the crew coordination 
performance of the copilot was positively associated with 
task performance; that is, better communication and mission 
analysis with improved flight performance and better 
situation awareness with improved problem solving 
performance. It appears that if the copilot was able to 
keep abreast of mission and flight status and provide timely 
information to the pilot, both flight and problem solving 
performance were enhanced. In contrast, only leadership 
ratings for the pilot were positively associated with flight 
performance in the manual condition; ratings of mission 
analysis and situation awareness behaviors for the pilot 
were negatively associated. The exhibition of mission 
analysis and situation awareness behaviors on the part of 
the pilot may actually have been in response to deviations 
in flight performance rather than preventative behaviors. 
Another explanation for the negative relationship of pilot 
ratings and flight performance may be related to the burden 
of the physical demand placed on the pilot in manual flight. 
The extra efforts made by the pilot, other than to provide 
directive behaviors, may have contributed to deteriorated 
flight performance by overtaxing the resources available to 
the pilot.
In the automated condition, flight performance was 
positively associated again with ratings of the copilot's 
communication, and problem solving performance with ratings
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of the copilot's mission analysis. Flight performance was 
negatively associated with ratings of the pilot's mission 
analysis, situation awareness, and also assertiveness. The 
results in automated flight suggest that the higher ratings 
that the pilot received were related to an awareness of 
flight deviations rather than an overload.
These results provide some evidence of the changing 
structure of the flight task across levels of automation as 
hypothesized by Norman & Orlady (1989a). During the manual 
condition, the crew dealt essentially with two tasks: 
controlling the aircraft and planning an optimal route of 
flight. In this mode of flight, the primary responsibility 
of the pilot was to keep the aircraft aloft. Planning a 
route of flight to obtain and deliver supplies was typically 
a task relegated to the copilot in light of the physical 
demand placed on the pilot.
In contrast during automated flight, tasks were 
reallocated among the crew members and the system. The 
autopilot assumed the moment-to-moment control of the 
aircraft, freeing the pilot to perform other tasks as less 
attention was focused on the direct control of flight. 
Although problem solving was a task that was generally 
handled by the copilot in the manual condition, the pilot 
was more available to share in the development of the flight 
plan in automated flight. Unfortunately, this reallocation 
of tasks did not produce better problem solutions in the
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automated condition, perhaps because of the diffusion of 
responsibility noted earlier by Farrell (1987). In this 
situation, a lack of clearly defined duties may have 
obscured the potential benefits of automation.
Summary
The results of the present investigation add to a 
complex pattern of results found in the aviation literature. 
Although automation generally is assumed to reduce the 
workload of crews, a reduction that was accomplished in this 
investigation, the decreased workload that was associated 
with automatic flight did not consistently improve 
performance on flight tasks or in the development of an 
optimal flight path to obtain and deliver supplies. In 
addition, the manipulation of task difficulty produced fewer 
effects than hypothesized. It may be that the benefits of 
automatic systems are apparent only in the case of more 
extreme workload levels in which manual control is more 
difficult to maintain over time. These results are 
consistent with the mixed results of previous research 
findings derived from higher fidelity flight simulations 
(Wickens et al., 1989; Wiener et al., 1991) and other 
experimental data (Ephrath & Curry, 1977; Fuld, Liu, & 
Wickens, 1987; Young, 1969).
The hypotheses concerning crew coordination received 
some support. The hypothesis regarding the distribution of 
crew coordination behaviors was partially confirmed in that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
several dimensions of crew coordination behaviors occurred 
more frequently in relation to the level of automation. The 
most remarkable difference between the two conditions is the 
increased frequency of coordination behaviors observed in 
the automated condition. It appears that any "saved" 
processing resources afforded by the automatic flight 
condition may have been invested in more frequent 
communications. Also, in support of the findings of 
Clothier (1991), crew coordination performance was also 
better in the automated condition. It may be that the 
automated condition provided more of an opportunity or 
perhaps a requirement for the crew members to coordinate.
Efforts to identify the coordination behaviors that 
were associated with task performance met with limited 
success. The frequency of coordination behaviors predicted 
a few small, yet significant amount of variance in the 
performance measures. However, the ratings of crew 
coordination performance demonstrated more predictive power 
than did frequency.
In summary, the results of the present investigation 
demonstrate the complex relationship between automation, 
workload, performance, and coordination. Several additional 
conclusions that may be drawn from this study are discussed 
below.
First, the utility of the ACOE to discriminate between 
coordination behaviors was shown; that is, interrater
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reliability for the observations and ratings of crew 
coordination behaviors were demonstrated. Because the 
nature of aviation tasks may change even more as a function 
of increasing advanced technology systems, it is possible 
that advanced aviation systems may require special behaviors 
not assessed by current crew coordination measurement 
instruments. Efforts should be made to identify other 
behaviors more specific to advanced cockpits.
Second, the results of the present investigation 
converge to illustrate the utility of low fidelity 
simulation to assess the effects of automation on crew 
coordination. The use of a low fidelity simulation produced 
results comparable with higher level simulations; however, 
the generalizabilty of the findings to more advanced 
technology aircraft is unknown. It must be noted that these 
data are derived from a simulation that employed only one 
automatic system. Advanced aircraft currently employ 
increasing levels of flight control, in addition to 
integrated data displays and intelligent systems. It is 
necessary then to replicate these results in either higher 
fidelity simulations or actual aircraft to assess their 
generalizabilty. Additionally, it is unclear whether 
results obtained with one type of automatic system 
generalize across levels of automation. The investigation 
of a range of automated systems would provide more 
information.
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Third, a related concern is the measurement of flight 
performance in advanced systems. Traditional performance 
measures (e.g., course deviation) may be less useful in the 
study of advanced technology aircraft. Performance 
parameters must be identified and validated to allow 
researchers to differentiate between effective and 
ineffective or acceptable and unacceptable performance in 
these systems.
Fifth, the manipulation of task difficulty in this 
investigation was an environmental one because of the 
limitations of the software. Other characteristics of the 
flight task may need to be altered to investigate the 
effects of automation more closely. Kantowitz and Casper 
(1988) have suggested comparisons of regular vs irregular 
operations. The introduction of system failures or abnormal 
conditions (e.g., snow closing an airport) would provide 
additional situations in which to assess performance and 
coordination in aircraft with higher levels of automation.
Sixth, manipulations of the reliability of the 
automation may shed additional light on the interactions 
among crew members and system. Parasuraman, Bahri, Molloy, 
and Singh (1991) reported that complacency and its 
performance consequences in system monitoring were related 
to the reliability and consistency of the automation. Such 
a manipulation in the investigation of advanced aircraft
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systems may identify guidelines for system reliability as 
well as for crew training to deal with unreliability.
Finally, a thorough analysis of the interface between 
pilot and system is recommended before comparing automated 
aircraft in relation to reduction of workload and 
improvement of performance, or even crew coordination. 
Reports of the mixed consequences of automation may be 
related to poorly designed system interfaces. A closer 
examination of the interfaces may clarify performance 
differences.
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APPENDIX A:
PREMISSION BRIEFING FOR THE TORNADO DISASTER. 
HIGH DIFFICULTY SCENARIO




During this flight scenario, you will be performing as 
two off-duty military officers responding to a civilian 
disaster. You will by flying a Cessna 182RG. While serving 
as an emergency rescue and supply aircrew, your mission is 
to pick up and deliver supplies to a disaster site. Your 
aircraft is currently located at the end of runway 27 at the 
O'Hare airport. During your mission you will be interacting 
with 3 controlling agencies: the tower, center, and 
operations. The frequency for the tower is 119.1. Center 
frequency is 132.5, and Operations is 119.25. Operations 
will provide you with specific information regarding the 
disaster.
To be prepared for this mission, you should have the 
aircraft's checklists, the area map, a flight plan log, a 
flight computer, a mission log, and pen or pencil. Do not 
advance in the mission log until you have been instructed by 
Operations.
DISASTER SUMMARY
Initial reports indicate that a tornado has touched down 
at three locations in your flight area. These sites are 
Spring Brook, Kankakee, and Fair Oak. A state of emergency 
has been declared for each locality. Several hundred 
civilians have been affected. No fatalities have occurred, 
but some injuries have been reported. As an emergency
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rescue and supply aircrew, your mission is to pick up and 
deliver supplies to one of the three disaster sites.
Current reports indicated that airports located near these 
sites are open and unaffected.
There are eleven airfields between Midway and the 
disaster sites. Each airfield has one specific supply. You 
will be notified of what supply is located at each airport. 
PROCEDURES
A supply is picked up from a supply point or delivered to 
a disaster site by flying through the box located over the 
airfield. This box is 1000' square and the center of it is 
located at 4000' MSL. You cannot fly over an airfield 
without picking up a supply. Furthermore, you may only fly 
the airways depicted on the map. For example, you cannot 
fly directly from O'Hare to Frankfort without flying over 
other airfields. Since time is critical, Center will 
provide you with specific times your are to arrive at each 
supply site. Unfortunately, because of time and aircraft 
limitations, it is unlikely that all supplies can be picked 
up. To ensure that the most valuable supplies reach a 
disaster site, it is important that you give consideration 
to the usefulness of the supplies before departure. Upon 
arrival in the cockpit, call Operations for further 
instructions.
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WEATHER
Flight service reports weather south of Midway to be clear 
with moderate turbulence at 4000'. Winds at 4000' are 210 
at 20. O'Hare altimeter is 30.01.
PERFORMANCE
Your crew's performance will be assessed by determining 
how well you maintained 4000', followed the airways shown, 
and reached your points at assigned times. Performance will 
also be assessed by determining the utility of the supplies 
you delivered.
Do not advance in the mission log until instructed by 
Operations. Your actual flight planning will be done in the 
cockpit. Contact Operations on 119.25 for further 
information as soon as you arrive in the cockpit. If you 
have any questions, please ask them now.
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APPENDIX B:
MAP OF THE TORNADO SCENARIO
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Record supplies in order of their usefulness.
(1 = least useful; 11 = most useful)
Supply Rank











DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED
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Aircrew Supply Ranking
Record ranks according to aircrew agreement. 
(1 = least useful; 11 = most useful)
Supply Rank









10. water purifiers ____
11. ropes ____
Supply
1. first aid kit Frankfort 7. drugs Lansing
2. water Crown Point 8. tents Seneca
3. flashlights Lewis 9. chainsaws Twin Peaks
4. food Hobart 10. water purifiers Joilet
5. blankets Aurora 11. ropes Charlotte
6. power generators Yorkville
DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED
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REMEMBER
Airfields between Midway and the disaster sites have 
only one supply.
Supplies are picked up by flying through the box over 
the airfield.
Only 4 supplies can be picked up for delivery to a 
disaster site.
You may only fly the airways indicated on the map.
If you fly over a supply airfield, you have picked up a 
supply.
Report next destination to Operations 2 miles prior to 
Midway. Then contact Center for clearance.
DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED
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SUPPLIES USEFUL AT EACH DISASTER SITE
**** The number beside each supply denotes the point value 
of that supply for a particular disaster site.
Fair Oak Kankakee Sorincr Brook
6 drugs 6 ropes 6 drugs
5 first aid kits 5 blankets 5 first aid kits
4 blankets 4 chainsaws 4 blankets
3 flashlights 3 drugs 3 flashlights
2 water 2 first aid kits 2 tents
1 food 1 flashlights 1 water
REMEMBER
Deliver 4 supplies to one disaster site.
Higher the number, the more useful the supply ( 0 - 1 7  
points possible).
If equal supply points, choose shorter flight path.
Report next destination to Operations 2 miles prior to 
Lewis. Then contact Center for clearance.
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APPENDIX D:
SCRIPT FOR THE TORNADO DISASTER. HIGH DIFFICULTY SCENARIO
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Script for Controlling Agencies for Tornado Disaster,
High Difficulty Scenario 
Operations We have sketchy information about the 
disasters at this time. Bad weather is currently dictating 
the first 2 legs of your mission so that it's important that 
you get off the ground soon and be heading in the general 
direction of the supplies and disasters. First, fly from 
OHare to Meigs and then on to Midway. Maintain 4000 feet 
and remain on the designated airways as closely as possible. 
After completing the initial route, you'll be responsible 
for determining which supplies you pick up and developing a 
flight plan to deliver them. We'll provide you with 
additional information as we receive it. The flight plan 
attached to your mission log should be completed for each 
destination throughout your mission. Now, take a few 
minutes to begin individually ranking these supplies in 
order of their usefulness in providing disaster relief.
These supplies are listed on page 1 of your mission log. A 
rank of 1 is most useful; a rank of 11 is least useful.
Your time is limited so do not discuss your rankings with 
your crew mate at this time. You'll be provided with an 
opportunity to do so after departure. Complete your 
checklists and expect departure in six minutes at -
approximately _____. Do not miss your departure time.
Contact Tower for clearance at that time.
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Tower 1FS, O'Hare Tower, winds 210 at 20, altimeter,
30.01. Upon departure, climb runway heading to 1500'. 
Cleared for takeoff. Begin secondary task by pressing any 
key on the keypad.
SEGMENT 1 - OHARE TO MEIGS 
Tower (1200 ft) 1FS, Tower. Remember, this is a MANUAL (OR 
AUTOPILOT) FLIGHT. Contact Midland center 132.5, Good Day. 
Center 1FS, Midland Center, Radar contact, resume own 
navigation. Climb and maintain 4000'. Your expected
arrival time at Meigs is _________ . Contact Operations on
119.25. Report back on.
Operations 1FS, Operations. We have an update for your 
mission on page (2) of your mission log. Because you aren't 
going to be able to carry all the supplies needed for this 
mission, both of you must decide which supplies are most 
useful. After reaching an agreement, record your crew's 
ranking in the mission log. Also shown is a listing of the 
locations where the supplies are located. We'll contact you 
as soon as we have more information as to the status of the 
disaster areas. Monitor Center frequency for expected time 
to MIDWAY.
SEGMENT 2 - MEIGS TO MIDWAY 
Center 1FS, Center. Your expected arrival time at MIDWAY is
 . Operations is requesting you contact them for a
mission update. Report back on.
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Operations 1FS, Operations. Looks like you only have 
enough time to pick up 4 supplies. Therefore, you must 
develop a flight plan to pick up and deliver 4 supplies to 
any one of the sites. Remember, your mission involves 
acquiring and delivering the most useful supplies as 
possible, in addition to reaching each airfield at the 
appropriate time. However, you may only fly the airways 
shown on the map. Furthermore, you may not fly over an 
airfield without picking up a supply. Report your next 
destination to us 2 miles before reaching MIDWAY. Repeat, 2 
miles prior to MIDWAY. Then monitor Center for time to your 
next destination. If you need a review of these 
instructions, Page 3 of your mission log provides one.
[After call about destination]
Operations 1FS, Operations. We're currently receiving 
reports about the severity of the damages at each disaster 
site and the supplies actually needed. After reaching 
Midway, proceed to LEWIS for a pick up of FLASHLIGHTS.
We'll provide additional information to you as we receive 
it. Contact Center with Lewis destination.
SEGMENT 3 - MIDWAY TO LEWIS
Center 1FS, Center. Understand destination ______ . Your
expected arrival time at LEWIS is _________ . Contact
Operations for mission update. Report back on.
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Operations 1FS, Operations. We've just received a list of 
priority supplies needed at each individual disaster site. 
Page 4 in your mission log indicates each disaster site and 
the usefulness of the supplies needed in terms of point 
values. The higher the number, the more useful the supply 
at that site. If a supply isn't listed, that indicates the 
supply is of no value at that site. Given this information, 
your mission is to deliver a group of four supplies to a 
disaster site and obtain the most points possible.
Acquiring the higher point values ensures that the supplies 
that arrive can be used. The sum of obtainable points range 
from 0 to 16. In the event that you are able to obtain an 
equal number of supply points from two flight paths, you 
should choose the shorter route. Inform us of your next 
destination two miles before you reach LEWIS. Then contact 
Center for the expected time to your next destination.
Operations 1FS, Operations. Understand destination ______ .
Contact Center with next destination.
SEGMENT 4 - LEWIS TO 2ND SUPPLY
Center 1FS, Center. Understand destination ______ . Your
expected arrival time is __________ . Confirm with
Operations next destination 2 miles prior _____ . Report
back on.
Operations 1FS, Operations. Understand destination - 
Contact Center with next destination.
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SEGMENT 5 - 2nd SUPPLY TO 3RD SUPPLY
Center 1FS, Center. Understand destination _________ .
Your expected arrival time is __________ . Confirm with
Operations next destination 2 miles prior _____ . Report
back on.
Operations 1FS, Operations. Understand destination - 
_______ . Contact Center with next destination.
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CHECKLIST PROCEDURES CESSNA - MODEL R182
BEFORE STARTING ENGINE
1. Brakes —  TEST.
2. Landing Gear Lever —  DOWN.
3. Autopilot (if installed) —  OFF.
STARTING ENGINE
1. Carburetor Heat —  COLD.
2. Radios —  ON.
3. Mags -- SWITCH to start.
BEFORE TAKEOFF
1. Flight controls —  FREE and CORRECT.
2. Fuel Quantity —  CHECK.
3. Elevator Trim —  SET for takeoff.
4. Electric Trim (if installed) —  PREFLIGHT TEST.
5. Radios and Avionics —  SET.
10. Autopilot —  OFF.
TAKEOFF
1. Wing Flaps —  0°
2. Carburetor Heat —  OFF.
3. Power —  FULL THROTTLE and 2400 RPM.
4. Elevator Control —  LIFT NOSE WHEEL AT 7 0 KIAS.
5. Climb Speed —  80 KIAS (flaps UP).
6. Brakes —  APPLY momentarily when airborne.
7. Landing Gear —  RETRACT in climb out.
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ENROUTE CLIMB
1. Airspeed —  80-100 KIAS.
CRUISE
1. Power —  2100-2400 RPM.
2. Elevator Trim —  ADJUST.
AUTOPILOT - PILOT'S OPERATING SUPPLEMENT
SECTION 1 General
The Flight Simulator Autopilot is a two axis automatic 
flight control system that governs the position of the 
ailerons and elevators to provide automatic roll and pitch 
stability. The system also provides for tracking of VOR 
radials selected by the OBS and NAV 1 radio.
The major components in the Flight Simulator system 
consist of a single control unit mounted below the 
artificial horizon and the directional gyro. The autopilot 
is turned ON and OFF by moving the mouse arrow into the 
AUTOPILOT indicator box and clicking.
SECTION 2 Limitations
The following autopilot limitations must be followed 
during airplane operation.
1. Autopilot must be OFF for takeoff and landing.
2. Autopilot altitude is preselected at 4000' MSL
SECTION 3 Emergency Procedures
IN CASE OF AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTION
1. Airplane control stick - - OPERATE as required to 
manually override the autopilot
2. AUTOPILOT Indicator to OFF to disconnect autopilot 
system.
SECTION 4 Normal Procedures
BEFORE TAKEOFF AND LANDING:
1. AUTOPILOT indicator --- Ensure OFF
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IN-FLIGHT OPERATIONS:
1. The autopilot is configured to climb at a rate of 500 
FPM only.
2. The autopilot is preconfigured to an altitude of 4000 
MSL.
DESCENT:
1. AUTOPILOT indicator to OFF 
VOR COUPLING:
1. The autopilot is configured to track VOR radials based 
upon information in the OBS and the NAV 1 radio.
2. The airplane will automatically intercept and then 
track the selected VOR course. The AUTOPILOT must be 
turned OFF when the selected VOR course is changed, and 
then turned ON again.
3. The desired course must be within 90 degrees of current 
heading for the AUTOPILOT to work effectively.
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APPENDIX F:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CREW MEMBERS
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Pilot Responsibilities





Assume duties as assigned.
Aircrew Responsibilities 
Monitor status of instruments and controls.
Arrive at destinations on schedule.
Communicate effectively with crew member.
Communicate effectively with ATC and operations.
Record information in mission log as required.
Provide assistance to each other.
Complete checklist procedures.
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Pilot Demographics
Crew Number: __________  Condition Order: (A,M) (M,A)
Date: __________  Scenario Order: (G,T) (T,G)
(H) (L)
Crew Position: (Pilot) (Copilot)
Please take a moment to complete the following questions. 
Remember all information will remain confidential.
1. Age:___ _______
2. Gender: (Male) (Female) (circle one)







4. What are your total flight hours? __________________
5. Have you flown Microsoft Flight Simulator before?
(Yes) (No)
6. If you responded "Yes" to question 5, how many hours 
have you flown Microsoft Flight Simulator? ___________
7. Have you flown any other airplane flight simulators for 
training purposes? (Yes) (No)
8. If you responded "Yes" to question 7, how many hours 
have you flown in other airplane flight simulators? ___
9. Do you play video/computer games? (Yes) (No)
10. If you responded "Yes" to question 9, how many hours 
per week do you engage video/computer games? (This does 
not include Microsoft Flight Simulator) ______________
11. How long have you known your crew mate? ____ (months)
12. Have you flown with your crew mate before today?
(Yes) (No)
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Crew:______  Position: (Pilot) (Copilot)
We are interested in vour opinions concerning the experiment in which 
you just completed. Please take a moment to complete the following 
questions. Your responses will aid our effort in developing future 
research. Respond to each question by circling the number which best 
represents your experience.
1. The experimental scenarios flown were representative of how 
aircraft may be used in response to emergency situations.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
not at somewhat moderately very extremely
all representative representative
2. The flight performance requirements (maintaining altitude, course, 
and time requirements) of the scenarios accurately reflected issues 
important in aviation.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
not at somewhat moderately very extremely
all accurate accurate
3. The decision making requirements of the scenarios accurately 
reflected issues important in aviation.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
not at somewhat moderately very extremely
all accurate accurate
4. The training flight scenario provided adequate practice for the 
experimental scenarios.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
not at somewhat moderately very extremely
all adequate adequate
5. To what extent did you become complacent during the experimental 
scenario in which the autopilot WAS used ?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
not at somewhat moderately very extremely
all complacent complacent
6. To what extent did you become complacent during the experimental 
scenario in which the autopilot was NOT used?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
not at somewhat moderately very extremely
all complacent complacent
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7. Have you received any cockpit resource management 
training?
(Yes) (No)
8. How many hours classroom time? __________
9. COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX I:
CREW COORDINATION BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION SCALE
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Rater: ________  Crew:   Time:   Leg:
Start/Stop: ____________
Stmt:




Define tasks based on mission requirements. 
Question data/ideas re: mission accomplishments. 
Devise long/short term plans.
Id potential impact of unplanned events on mission. 






Provide information in advance.
Demonstrate awareness of task performance of self/others. 
Identify problems/potential problems.
Recognize need for action.




Gather information before making decision. 
Cross check information sources.
Identify alternatives & contingencies. 
Anticipate consequences of decisions. 
Provide rationale for decision.
LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP
Determine tasks to be assigned.
Ask for input, discussed problem.
Focus crew attention to task.
Told crew member what to do.
Inform crew member of mission progress. 
Provide a legitimate avenue of dissent. 




Ask questions when uncertain.
Make suggestions.
State opinions on decisions/procedures. 
Confront ambiguities and conflicts. 




Alter behaviors to meet situational demands. 
Receptive to other's ideas.
Step in and help others.






Repeat information as required.
Ask for clarification of a communication. 
Used standard terminology.
Provide information as required.
Provide information when asked.
Verbalize plans for procedures/maneuvers.
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APPENDIX J:
CREW COORDINATION BEHAVIO RAL SUMMARY SCALES






Mission analysis involves the organization and assessment of 
the information that pertains to the crew's assignment 
(i.e., mission).
5 Complete skill
4 Very much skill 
3 Adequate ski 11
2 Some skill 
1 Hardly any skill
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
Crew members identify and prioritize the 
tasks that must be performed to accomplish 
the mission; anticipate the consequences of 
unexpected changes in mission requirements; 
review their plan of action to ensure that 
the plan maximizes the resources.
Crew members make short term plans, but 
ususally do not anticipate future events; 
outline the immediate tasks required for the 
mission.
Crew members are unable or unwilling to 
determine what is important or relevant to 
the accomplishment of the mission; assume the 
first plan to accomplish the mission is the 











Situational awareness refers to the maintenance of an 
accurate perception of the environment, both internal and 
external to the aircraft. The crew is oriented to mission 
activities, flight status, and alternative courses of 
action. This awareness may enchance the ability of the crew 
members to take appropriate actions.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
Crew members note inappropriate trends in 
gauges before deviations occur; anticipate 
the need for information and provide it in 
advance; monitor the actions of themselves 
and others for satisfactory performance; are 
sensitive to changes in other crew members7 
needs; are consistently aware of their 
position and heading relative to ground 
navigation aids.
Crew members are sometimes aware of the 
performance of other crew members; detect 
deviations from normal readings, procedures 
or tasks before gross deviations occur; 
generally know the status of their mission 
accomplishments; have a general idea of 
aircraft position.
Crew members fail to check their own or 
other's actions to ensure that tasks are 
properly executed; show confusion as to their 
progress in accomplishing the mission; 
typically provide information after an action 
should have been taken; fails to detect 
significant deviations from desired 
parameters; are not aware of aircraft 
position.
Crew Copilot Pilot




4 Very much skill 
3 Adequate skill
2 Some skill 
1 Hardly any






Decision making refers to the processes by which logical and 
sound judgements are made based on the information 
available. This involves the method by which data is 
collected and integrated into a strategy for task 
performance.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill Crew members anticipate the consequences of 
decisions and related consequences in order 
to prepare to take alternative actions; 
consistently consider several factors before 
making a decision; verify information by 
cross checking sources before making a final 
decision.
4 Very much skill
3 Adequate ski 11 Crew members generally acquire all critical 
information needed for immediate decision 
making; typically are prepared for immediate 
actions that must be taken.
2 Some skill
1 Hardly any ski 11 Crew members are rarely prepared to make 
immediate decisions when unanticipated events 
occur; fail to seek information that may 
enhance decisions; fail to consider the 











Leadership involves the direction, organization, and support 
of other crew members. It can be shown by crew members 
other than individuals with formal authority.
5 Complete skill
4 Very much skill 
3 Adequate ski 11
2 Some ski 11 
1 Hardly any skill
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
Crew members quickly assess a situation when 
the crew appears overwhelmed and structure 
the activities of others by assigning tasks 
or by focusing attention to a task to be 
performed; identify and delay non-critical 
duties until low workload periods; facilitate 
crew performance by giving feedback without 
creating conflict.
Crew members provide direction only when a 
problem occurs; inform other members that 
they are performing a task poorly rather than 
providing specific guidance; provide task 
oriented focus only when responding to a 
deviation.
Crew members leave others to govern their own 
behaviors by providing little feedback when 
the correct course of action is unclear; 
create an atmosphere in which disagreements 
are not tolerated or confronted; discount the 











Assertiveness involves the offer of opinions or beliefs to 
other crew members, particularily when the the situation is 
unclear or the offer is unsolicited. This may also refer to 
an admission of uncertainity on the part of a crew member.
5 Complete skill
4 Very much ski 11 
3 Adequate skill
2 Some skill 
1 Hardly any skill
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
Crew members present information essential to 
proper execution of tasks, even when conflict 
is present; speak up when they believe a 
particular course of action is best; display 
a willingness to seek assistance rather than 
struggle and make mistakes; directly confront 
differences of opinion in a positive manner.
Crew members admit they need help when their 
need is obvious; provides nonjudgemental 
prompts in response to deviations from 
desired flight parameters.
Crew members fail to offer suggestions or 
assistance when the situation is unclear; are 
unwilling to ask for help even when it is 
available; withhold critical pieces of 
information from other crew members; make 
extraneous sarcastic remarks when deviations 











Adaptability/flexibility refers to the willingness of crew 
members to change their behaviors or plans to accommodate 
the situation.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill
4 Very much skill 
3 Adequate skill
2 Some skill 
1 Hardly any ski 11
Crew members assist others that are having 
difficulty by redistributing workload when 
possible; easily adjust to changes based on 
new information or demands; anticipate if a 
crew member will need help prior to an event.
Crew members do not provide help until they 
are asked; provide assistance in accordance 
with their assigned duties.
As time constraints increase, crew members 
are unwilling to concede a position; display 
an unwillingness to attempt to eliminate 
overload conditions for others; are reluctant 












Communication involves the exchange of information between 
crew members in a manner that enhances performance. 
Frequently the purpose of communication is to prevent 
misunderstandings by clarifying or acknowledging critical 
information.
5 Complete skill
4 Very much skill 
3 Adequate skill
2 Some skill 
1 Hardly any skill
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
Crew members ensure that messages are 
understood by requesting clarification when 
confused or by repeating information; keep 
each other informed of the current status of 
tasks and of their future intentions; utilize 
standard language and provide redundancy cues 
to reduce the likelihood of errors.
Crew members acknowledge decisions made; 
provide information when requested; convey 
information essential to effective task 
performance.
Crew members rarely acknowledge information 
offered or requested; fail to request 
clarification of an unclear message; 
typically take actions or make decisions 
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APPENDIX K:
GUIDELINES FOR THE CREW COORDINATION
BEHAVIORAL SUMMARY SCALES
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Mission Analysis Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Mission Analysis 
Crew members identify and prioritize the tasks that must be 
performed to accomplish the mission; anticipate the 
consequences of unexpected changes in mission requirements; 
review their plan of action to ensure that the plan 
maximizes the resources.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Mission 
Analysis:
After receiving mission instructions from Operations 
during the first leg of the mission, the copilot 
indicates that they should first assess the usefulness 
of the supplies, determine their location, and then 
plan a flight path.
The crew notes that if Operations reroutes their flight 
course again they may need to reassess their supply 
priorities.
After deciding on a flight path to obtain the supplies, 
the crew scrutinizes the plan to confirm that the most 
supply points will be obtained.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Mission Analysis
Crew members make short term plans, but ususally do not 
anticipate future events; outline the immediate tasks 
required for the mission
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Mission 
Analysis:
During the first leg of their mission, the crew 
identifies the usefulness of the supplies and plans to 
obtain the top 5 or 6; however, they do not consider 
that the location of the supplies may affect their 
ability to obtain them quickly.
The copilot indicates that the crew must fly from Meigs 
to Midway because of poor weather in addition to 
developing a crew ranking of supply usefulness.
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Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Any Skill11 in Mission Analysis
Crew members are unable or unwilling to determine what is 
important or relevant to the accomplishment of the mission; 
assume the first plan to accomplish the mission is the best 
without considering alternatives.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in Mission 
Analysis:
Throughout the mission the crew does not attempt to 
clarify their confusion about the requirements to 
accomplish the mission successfully.
The crew develops only one flight plan to deliver 
supplies; they never examine alternative routes.
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Situational Awareness Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Situational 
Awareness
Crew members note inappropriate trends in gauges before 
deviations occur; anticipate the need for information and 
provide it in advance; monitor the actions of themselves and 
others for satisfactory performance; are sensitive to 
changes in other crew members' needs; are consistently aware 
of their position and heading relative to ground navigation 
aids.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Situational 
Awareness:
The pilot indicates that the altitude is beginning to 
drop very slightly in relation to the use of the 
autopilot at slow speeds.
Two to three miles before passing over the VOR, the 
copilot informs the pilot what the next heading will 
be.
The copilot notes that they will be reach the next 
station crossing 2 minutes early unless the pilot 
decreases airspeed to 100 knots.
Because the copilot is aware the pilot is having 
difficulty maintaining altitude, the copilot does not 
attempt to question her about her ranking of the 
supplies until the altitude is established.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Situational 
Awareness
Crew members are sometimes aware of the performance of other 
crew members; detect deviations from normal readings, 
procedures or tasks before gross deviations occur; generally 
know the status of their mission accomplishments; have a 
general idea of aircraft position.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Situational 
Awareness:
The pilot notices when the copilot has input an 
incorrect frequency, especially if she needs to make 
the radio call immediately.
The crew notes that they haven't put the landing gear 
up before they reach 1500 feet.
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After a moments consideration, the copilot indicates 
that they have only picked up two supplies because no 
supplies were located at their first two station 
crossings.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill11 in Situational 
Awareness
Crew members fail to check their own or other's actions to 
ensure that tasks are properly executed; show confusion as 
to their progress in accomplishing the mission; typically 
provide information after an action should have been taken; 
fail to detect significant deviations from desired 
parameters; are not aware of aircraft position.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in Situation 
Awareness:
The crew engages in several games of "tic-tac-toe" and 
fail to notice that they have lost 2000 feet in 
altitude.
The crew spends five minutes attempting to determine 
how many more supplies they should obtain.
After the aircraft passes over the VOR and in response 
to a query from the pilot, the copilot tells the pilot 
what the new heading should be.
The crew notices that they have flown several miles in 
the wrong direction.
The copilot consistently asks the pilot where they are 
on the map.
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Decision Making Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Decision Making
Crew members anticipate the consequences of decisions and 
related consequences in order to prepare to take alternative 
actions; consistently consider several factors before making 
a decision; verify information by cross checking sources 
before making a final decision.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Decision 
Making:
The crew realizes that if they fly a 360 degree circle 
to slow their arrival time, they may actually arrive 
later than the designated time.
Before deciding between two flight routes of equal 
value, the crew considers the distance in addition to 
the usefulness of the supplies.
The crew compares their individual supply rankings 
before finalizing their crew ranking.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Decision Making
Crew members generally acquire all critical information 
needed for immediate decision making; typically are prepared 
for immediate actions that must be taken.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Decision 
Making:
The pilot attempts to identify why the distance is 
increasing on the DME by first asking the copilot if 
the correct NAV radio is on, then asking if the correct 
TO-FROM indication is shown on the OBI and if the 
appropriate NAV frequency has been input.
When the stall warning sounds as the aircraft 
approaches the station, the pilot immediately increases 
the throttle and after verifying a safe airspeed, the 
copilot brings the flaps up.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill" in Decision Making
Crew members are rarely prepared to make immediate decisions 
when unanticipated events occur; fail to seek information 
that may enhance decisions; fail to consider the 
consequences of their decisions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in Decision 
Making:
After the crew is reminded that they may not fly over 
the same airfield twice, they have difficulty 
identifying another supply point; they do not reach a 
decision until they have flown several minutes past 
their immediate destination.
The crew declares the autopilot completely inoperative 
without reviewing the supplemental autopilot procedure 
checklist. Also, when forced with a location 
incongruity, the crew choses to disregard other 
information sources that may validate their position 
(e.g., call to Center, use of alternate NAVAIDS).
The crew does not discuss how their decision to 
maintain the cruise speed indicated on the checklist 
will compromise their ability to reach each station 
crossing at the appropriate time.
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Assertiveness Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Assertiveness
Crew members present information essential to proper 
execution of tasks, even when conflict is present; speak up 
when they believe a particular course of action is best; 
display a willingness to seek assistance rather than 
struggle and make mistakes; directly confront differences of 
opinion in a positive manner.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in 
Assertiveness:
After reaching their first station crossing three 
minutes early, the pilot reminds the copilot that one 
of their goals is to reach check points at the 
designated time, even if it means that the cruise speed 
indicated on the checklist cannot be maintained.
The copilot recommends that they gain better control of 
the aircraft before they begin to decide on the crew 
ranking of disaster supplies.
The pilot admits that he doesn't understand the 
instructions for obtaining the supplies and requests 
the copilot explain them.
The copilot notes that their idea of supply usefulness 
appears to be totally opposite and suggests they 
discuss their rationale.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Assertiveness
Crew members admit they need help when their need is 
obvious; provides nonjudgemental prompts in response to 
deviations from desired flight parameters.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in 
Assertiveness:
After repeated attempts to calculate the needed 
airspeed, the copilot indicates that he's forgotten how 
to perform that task.
After the pilot makes several unsuccessful attempts to 
fly over the VOR, the copilot recommends that she 
regain altitude before making another attempt.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill11 in Assertiveness
Crew members fail to offer suggestions or assistance when 
the situation is unclear; are unwilling to ask for help even 
when it is available; withhold critical pieces of 
information from other crew members; make extraneous 
sarcastic remarks when deviations from desired performance 
are noted.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in 
Assertiveness;
The copilot sits silently and makes no suggestions 
while he waits for the pilot to determine their route 
of flight.
The copilot has forgotten how to calculate airspeeds, 
but does not ask for assistance.
The copilot refuses to switch the DME to distance at 
the request of the pilot.
After noting that the copilot is having difficulty 
computing ground speed, the pilot comments that "a 
monkey can compute required ground speed faster than 
you can".
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Leadership Guidelines
Behavioral summary of "Complete Skill11 in Leadership
Crew members quickly assess a situation when the crew 
appears overwhelmed and structure the activities of others 
by assigning tasks or by focusing attention to a task to be 
performed; identify and delay non-critical duties until low 
workload periods; facilitate crew performance by giving 
feedback without creating conflict.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Leadership:
When the copilot appears overwhelmed with new supply 
delivery instructions, the pilot recommends that they 
calm down first, ensure they are on the correct 
heading, and then worry about what supplies to deliver.
The copilot suggests that they wait to develop a flight 
plan until after the pilot has the aircraft stabilized.
The pilot explains that although the copilot is 
consistently inputting the correct frequencies for 
radio calls, the pilot needs to know when that action 
has been completed.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Leadership
Crew members provide direction only when a problem occurs; 
inform other members that they are performing a task poorly 
rather than providing specific guidance; provides task 
oriented focus only when responding to a deviation.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Leadership:
The pilot announces that because of the high workload 
present at that time, all nonessential tasks will be 
disregarded.
The pilot indicates that the airspeeds the copilot has 
calculated typically make the crew late to their next 
destination.
The copilot notes that they are 500 feet below assigned 
altitude and directs the pilot to increase altitude 
back to 4000 feet.
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Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill11 in Leadership
Crew members leave others to govern their own behaviors by 
providing little feedback when the correct course of action 
is unclear; create an atmosphere in which disagreements are 
not tolerated or confronted; discount the ideas of others.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in 
Leadership:
Although stall warnings keep sounding and the pilot is 
obviously having difficulty, the copilot does not offer 
any suggestions as to how to maintain altitude.
Throughout the flight, the pilot repeatedly states that 
he is the pilot and therefore makes the decisions.
The pilot ignores any suggestions about aircraft 
handling that the copilot makes.
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Adaptability/Flexibility Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in 
Adaptab i1itv/Flexib i1itv
Crew members assist others that are having difficulty by 
redistributing workload when possible; easily adjust to 
changes based on new information or demands; anticipate if a 
crew member will need help prior to an event.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in 
Adaptability/ Flexibility;
The pilot begins making the radio calls after he 
notices the copilot is preoccupied with other duties.
After planning a route to pick up supplies, Operations 
instructs the crew to fly to a different supply point; 
the copilot quickly identifies the new heading and VOR 
frequency, thereby enabling the pilot to modify his 
flight path.
Because the autopilot is unreliable at speeds below 80 
knots, the copilot begins to monitor the altitude more 
closely when the aircraft is flying below 85 knots.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in 
Adaptability/Flexibility
Crew members do not provide help until they are asked; 
provide assistance in accordance with their assigned duties.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in 
Adaptability/ Flexibility:
The copilot is aware the pilot is having difficulty 
trimming the aircraft, but helps him adjust it only 
after the pilot requests help.
The copilot calculates the needed airspeed and informs 
the pilot.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill" in 
Adaptability/Flexibility
As time constraints increase, crew members are unwilling to 
concede a position; display an unwillingness to attempt to 
eliminate overload conditions for others; are reluctant to 
alter plans based new instructions or information.
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Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in 
Adaptability/ Flexibility:
The crew must inform Operations of their newly 
developed flight plan before reaching Midway; however, 
they continue to argue about the best course of action 
and are late in calling Operations with the new plan.
The pilot merely laughs as he comments that the copilot 
seems to be having difficulty completing his duties.
The pilot first instructs the copilot to dial up 
Operations and then changes his instruction to Center. 
The copilot grumbles about having to change what is 
already dialed in. The pilot has to direct the copilot 
a second time before the copilot acts.
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Communication Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Communication
Crew members ensure that messages are understood by 
requesting clarification when confused or by repeating 
information; keep each other informed of the current status 
of tasks and of their future intentions; utilize standard 
language and provide redundancy cues to reduce the 
likelihood of errors.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill” in 
Communication:
When the copilot tells the pilot to turn to a specific 
heading to get back on course, the pilot repeats the 
heading and then requests the copilot confirm the 
heading.
The copilot informs the pilot that he's input the 
correct nav frequency and will change the heading prior 
to the VOR.
When providing heading information, the copilot also 
provides the necessary direction of turn (e.g., "Left 
turn to a heading of 236 degrees”).
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill” in Communication
Crew members acknowledge decisions made; provide information 
when requested; convey information essential to effective 
task performance.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in 
Communication:
After the copilot indicates that he is turning off the 
autopilot, the pilot replies "roger".
After Center reports the crew's expected time to the 
next VOR, the copilot informs the pilot of the correct 
airspeed to fly in order to arrive on time.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill" in Communication
Crew members rarely acknowledge information offered or 
requested; fail to request clarification of an unclear 
message; typically take actions or make decisions without 
informing other crew members.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any" in Communication:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
Although the copilot provides numerous directions as to 
heading and airspeed, the pilot does not acknowledge 
his instructions.
The pilot issues an incomplete command regarding the 
communication frequency; the copilot does not ask him 
to repeat the message.
After determining that the speed of the aircraft should 
be changed, the copilot adjusts the throttle without 
notifying the pilot.
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